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Two Essays on the Conflict of Interests within the Financial Services Industry-- 
Financial Industry Consolidation: The Motivations and Consequences of the 
Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) and “Down but Not Out” Mutual 
Fund Manager Turnover within Fund Families 
Lonnie L. Bryant 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact the Financial Services 
Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999 has on the consolidation of the banking industry. 
The FSMA allows banks to simultaneously offer commercial banking, investment, and 
insurance services. I find a strong positive market response to the announcement of bank 
acquisition of brokerage firms (10.2%) and insurance companies (9.3%), but no 
significant response to bank acquisitions. I also find support for two complimentary 
hypotheses that explain the long-run returns to the acquiring banks. The “product-market 
spillover hypothesis” states that the post-consolidation returns of the acquirer are directly 
related to the banks’ ability to cross market their products and services to a more diverse 
client base, while the efficiency hypothesis states that banks acquire financial services 
companies to realize efficiency gains resulting from exploiting economies of scale. 
Finally, I show that the premiums paid in the post-FSMA acquisitions increases with the 
diversity of the transaction. 
In addition, this study is the first to link managerial turnover to mutual fund 
managerial structure in a manner that indicates the strong presence of a conflict of 
interests between investors and fund sponsors in an area of fund governance where we 
have been led to believe there are strong and well-functioning mechanisms to guard 
against the exploitation of investors. I utilize the unique characteristics of mutual funds 
where managers sometimes manage multiple “firms” simultaneously, something not 
 v 
 vi 
generally observed in industrial firms. I test the governance mechanisms using the mutual 
fund complexes management structure; unitary and multiple fund management (UFM and 
MFM). This study shows that UFMs tend to have higher asset growth rates and higher 
fees than MFMs, suggesting that sponsors can benefit more from keeping them intact. I 
find that changing managers under the UFM is more costly to sponsors making them 
more reluctant to fire poor performers. I document that underperforming UFM are            
-2.77% less likely to be replaced than their underperforming MFM counterparts. In 
addition, the conflict of interests affect the replacement decision, as high expense ratio 
fund managers have a lower probability of replacement for a given level of 
underperformance.  
 
 
 
Essay 1 
Financial Industry Consolidation: The motivations and consequences of 
the Financial Services Modernization Act 
Introduction 
On November 12, 1999, the United States Congress passed the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) allowing competition 
between commercial banks, brokerage firms and insurance companies. The FSMA 
repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 which prohibited banks from simultaneously 
offering commercial banking, investment, and insurance services. The FSMA allowed 
commercial and investment banks to consolidate; cross-selling banking services with 
insurance services, brokerage services, and other financial services. The combined 
industries are now known as the financial services industry. The implementation of 
the new legislation and hence, the inception of the financial services industry has 
resulted in unprecedented merger and acquisition activities (M&A) because financial 
companies are electing to purchase existing expertise in diverse financial services 
versus growing theses services organically.  
The ratification of the FSMA has led to intense competition between financial 
services companies to manage a diverse portfolio of financial service products. These 
regulatory changes have mixed implications regarding whether diversified financial 
service firms will provide better products and services than specialized financial 
services firms and, therefore, whether the FSMA adds to shareholder value. On one 
hand, diversification reduces costs due to economies of scale (Kwan and Laderman 
(1999)). However specialization produces a greater quality and/or variety of financial 
services potentially increasing sales (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (2000)).  
A second implication is that the FSMA allows financial services companies to 
participate in commercial banking, investment brokering, and insurance activities, 
providing customers with the convenience of having all their financial service needs 
1 
met at a single location. However, the Glass-Steagall Act was initially passed due to 
improper banking activity. The Act prohibited banks from participating in diverse 
security activities to protect depositors from the additional risk associated with 
security transactions. It was initially thought that banks that offer investment banking 
services and mutual funds were subject to conflicts of interest and other abuses. For 
instance, a commercial bank’s financial interest in the ownership, price, or 
distribution of securities would lead to increased pressure on banking customers to 
invest in securities that the bank sells. The repeal of the Glass-Stegall Act with the 
Financial Services Modernization Act suggests that these banking conflicts of 
interests are now of minimal concern1 and the consolidation of the financial industry 
will enhance social welfare.  Thus, it is an empirical question whether or not the 
regulatory changes and the resulting changes in the structure of the financial industry 
add value to shareholders. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to investigate 
whether and how financial services industry acquisitions in the post-FSMA period 
affect shareholder value. 
I examine two hypotheses–the efficiency hypothesis and the product market 
spillover hypothesis–to explain the source of any increase in shareholder value 
resulting from financial services industry acquisitions in the post-FSMA period. 
Theoretical arguments predict that mergers and acquisitions are motivated by target 
efficiency improvements that can be achieved by the acquirer (Calomiris and 
Karceski (1998) and Rhoades (1998)). Berger and Humphrey (1992) find that 
acquiring banks are more cost efficient than target banks. Efficiency may also be 
improved by M&A if increased diversification improves the risk-return relationship. 
Thus, the efficiency hypothesis states that acquiring banks increase shareholder value 
by purchasing other financial service industry companies and effectively managing 
the combination of the two firms more efficiently than the target management.  
The corporate M&A literature suggests that diversifying acquisitions are 
generally value-reducing, and that increases in corporate focus are value-enhancing 
                                                 
1 This might be because there are mechanisms in place to minimize the conflicts. 
2 
(Lang and Stulz (1994), Jensen and Ruback (1984), Berger and Ofek (1995) and John 
and Ofek (1995)). Due to the uniqueness of financial services industry assets, 
examining the financial service industry consolidation will provide a new perspective 
into the diversification benefits, or lack thereof, of mergers and acquisitions. Since 
the primary asset acquired is information in the form of a client list, the acquirers’ 
market returns will be directly related to the acquirers’ ability to cross-market its 
products and services to a more diverse customer base. Unlike the general result for 
industrial firms, we could observe positive wealth effects for acquirers resulting from 
the purchase of diverse financial products and services.2 In addition, the acquirers’ 
ability to tailor a variety of new products and services to existing customers should 
lead to increased sales and shareholder value.3 Diamond (1984) states that banks use 
private information about clients to make a profit. The FSMA allows for increased 
access to clients and therefore a greater chance to cross-market. Thus, the product 
market spillover hypothesis states that the acquirers’ returns primarily depend on the 
banks’ diversification of customers, products and services. 
While there has been considerable research on mergers and acquisitions, this 
is the first study to examine bank mergers and acquisitions after the creation of the 
financial services industry by the FSMA, when banks can merge with non-bank 
financial firms to obtain other than geographic diversification. Using the bank as the 
base organization, the FSMA allows us to examine three consolidation options – bank 
mergers with 1) banks, 2) investment firms or 3) insurance companies. It is 
reasonable to believe that there is a monotone increase in the organizational 
differences between banks as an acquirer and these three firm-types as targets. This 
then allows for an assessment of whether and how the degree of diversification in the 
financial services industry matters to investors. 
                                                 
2 Laeven and Levine (2006) find that banks that diversify trade at a value discount utilizing measures 
of Tobin’s Q. However, their study is based on bank to bank M&As. I consider the financial services 
industry acquisitions which includes bank to bank, bank to investment firm and bank to insurance 
company M&As. I employ univariate and multivariate analysis to examine financial service industry 
M&As. 
3 The acquirer can sell services to a larger client base including those of the target and it can sell the 
services of the target to its established customers. 
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The specific issues I address are as follows: Are there differences in the 
market reactions to (announcement effects of) the different consolidation options 
exercised by acquiring banks? Do the efficiency and/or spillover hypotheses explain 
the post-acquisition (long-term) returns of acquiring banks? In considering these two 
issues, I gauge investors’ short-term and long-run views on the benefits, or lack 
thereof, that the FSMA provides. Finally, I address a related issue: Does the 
acquisition premium reflect the degree of diversification in financial services industry 
acquisitions?  Benston et al. (1995) find that U.S. acquiring banks bid more for 
targets when the resulting combination leads to significant geographical 
diversification gains. The FSMA provides a unique opportunity to examine bank 
managers’ perception of the benefits of merging with the various firm-types, as 
reflected in their willingness to pay a higher premium for diversity.  
Utilizing all U.S. financial services industry affiliated mergers and 
acquisitions from 1999 to 2002, I find support for two complimentary hypotheses that 
explain the long-run returns to the acquiring banks. Using two measures of efficiency 
and various spillover variables to test the hypotheses, I find support for both 
hypotheses. I find that both profit efficiency and operation efficiency determines 
future returns. In addition, there is evidence that when banks engage in diversifying 
mergers with brokerage firms the effects of profit efficiency on post-consolidation 
returns is larger. After evaluating various spillover characteristics, the results indicate 
that acquiring financial firms take advantage of the product and service diversity.  
I document that on a year-by-year basis the acquisition premium ranges from 
17% to 23%. It appears that bank managers do not hold financial services 
diversification in high regards as witnessed by the decreasing premium for bank 
diversification mergers and acquisitions (bank to investment firm/ insurance company 
acquisitions). I find a larger premium for bank to bank acquisitions (18.7%) than bank 
to investment firm acquisitions (16.9%) and bank to insurance company acquisitions 
(8.5%). 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a 
background of the relevant legislation that has affected the financial services industry 
in the United States. Section III provides a review of the literature on both M&A in 
the banking industry and the impact the FSMA has on banks. Section IV discusses the 
non-financial industry mergers and acquisitions literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Specifically, Section IV presents the motives for combining banking 
services with other financial services. Section V describes the data and methodology 
and provides a sample description and preliminary statistics of the financial services 
industry over the 1999 to 2002 period. Section VI presents the announcement day 
abnormal return results of this study. The determinants of post-acquisition returns are 
presented in Section VI. The paper concludes with a summary of the findings in 
Section VII. 
 
 
 
Financial Services Industry Legislation Background4 
The United States government often plays an important role in constraining or 
encouraging financial industry consolidation activity by directly approving or 
disapproving individual mergers and acquisitions or by changing explicit or implicit 
regulatory restrictions on consolidation. In 1933, during the aftermath of the 1929 
stock market crash and the Great Depression, the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) was 
enacted. As a collective reaction to the worst financial crisis at the time, the GSA set 
up regulatory walls between commercial bank and investment bank activities. The 
1933 Glass-Steagall Act had two basic objectives, to: 1) require that investors receive 
significant or material information concerning securities being offered for public sale 
and 2) prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities. At 
this time, "improper banking activity" by overzealous commercial banks involved in 
stock market investment, was deemed the main culprit of the financial disaster.  
                                                 
4 Information pertaining to banking legislation was provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) at www.fdic.org. 
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The provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act were directed at specific abuses by 
financial service companies. First, Congress was concerned with banks investing their 
own assets in securities with consequent risk to commercial and savings deposits. 
Second, there was an issue with banks providing unsound loans to companies in 
which the bank had invested its own assets. Third, there was a concern that bank 
officials may be tempted to press their banking customers into investing in securities 
which the bank itself was under pressure to sell because of its own pecuniary stake in 
the transaction. The GSA was put in place to protect against commercial banks with 
financial interest in the ownership, price, or distribution of securities. Financial 
service companies were accused of being too speculative in the pre-Depression Era, 
not only because they were investing their assets in risky equities but also because 
they were buying new issues for resale to the public. As a result of their speculative 
disposition, the financial services industry objectives became blurred.  
The Glass-Steagall Act was the first major federal legislation to regulate the 
offer and sale of securities. Prior to the enactment of the GSA, the “Blue Sky” laws 
governed by the state regulated the securities market. The GSA of 1933 left in place 
the patchwork of existing state securities laws to supplement the federal law. Under 
the 1933 GSA, the company offering securities is required to disclose significant 
information about themselves and the terms of the securities to potential investors to 
assist in making an informed investment decision. In addition to the disclosure rule, 
the GSA required that banks separate commercial banking from investment banking 
services. Banks were given a year to decide on whether they would specialize in 
commercial or in investment banking. By creating this separation, the GSA attempted 
to prevent the banks' use of deposits to offset the losses of a failed underwriting 
division. Thus, the purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was to place restrictions 
against the improper banking activity that resulted from the conflict of interests of 
offering both commercial and investment banking service. 
In addition to the GSA, Congress passed the Bank Holding Company Act 
(BHCA) on May 9, 1956 to regulate the banking sector. This Act required Federal 
6 
Reserve Board’s approval for the establishment of a bank holding company and 
prohibited bank holding companies headquartered in one state from acquiring a bank 
in another state. The BHCA also prohibited a bank holding company from engaging 
in most non-banking activities or acquiring voting securities of certain companies that 
are not banks. Legislators were concerned that huge banking conglomerates would 
monopolize the banking industry. In addition, many non-bank businesses feared that 
firms affiliated with banks would gain a competitive advantage over unaffiliated 
competitors in the same industry. These non-banking businesses were concerned that 
firms affiliated with banks would receive preferential credit treatment from the banks 
and would have access to low-cost funds provided by them from non-interest-bearing 
deposits. There was also a concern that a bank would combine the access to credit 
with the purchase of services provided by its non-bank affiliates. For example, if all 
of the bank's commercial borrowers were required, as a condition of obtaining credit, 
to buy their business travel services from the bank holding company's travel agency, 
the independent travel agencies would be unable to compete. Given these concerns, 
Congress restricted non-bank activities and only permitted those activities incidental 
to banking or performing services for banks. Approved activities by the BHCA of 
1956 include ownership of the bank's premises, auditing and appraisal, and safe 
deposit services. The law required that nonconforming non-bank businesses be 
divested. However, the interstate acquisition restrictions of the BHCA were 
eradicated by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994 (IBBEA). IBBEA allowed interstate mergers between banks, subject to 
concentration limits, state laws and Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)5 
evaluations. 
                                                 
5 The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, revised in 1995, encourages depository institutions to 
help meet the credit needs of communities in which they operate, including low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods. The CRA requires federal agencies responsible for supervising such institutions to 
evaluate their compliance periodically and to take their records into account in considering 
applications for deposit facilities. 
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         The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 
1999 had the most influential impact on the financial services industry6. The FSMA 
repealed the Glass-Steagal Act, removing many of the remaining restrictions on 
combining commercial banking, securities underwriting, and insurance in 
consolidated organizations. This act opened competition between banks, securities 
companies and insurance companies to own and operate comparable financial 
services. Under the FSMA, individuals who would put money in investments when 
the economy is good can now put money into a saving account with the same 
company when the economy is bad. With the ratification of the FSMA, Congress was 
concerned with the sharing of customers’ private information between divisions of 
the financial service firm. Thus, included in the FSMA, the Financial Privacy Rule 
requires financial institutions to provide their clients a privacy notice that explains 
what information the company gathers about the client, where this information is 
shared, and how the company safeguards that information. The privacy notice must 
also explain the “opt-out” policy; which allows customers to not permit their 
information to be shared with affiliated parties. By eliminating the restrictions on the 
separation of commercial banking from securities and insurance activities, the 
Financial Services Modernization Act allows for the consolidation of financial 
services and the formation of financial conglomerates. 
 
Banking Industry Literature Review 
In the seminal literature of the banking industry, Diamond (1984) analyzed the 
monitoring and information gathering role of banks. Diamond (1984) theorized that 
under asymmetric information banks are able the extract positive profits from the 
private information about borrowers. Von Thadden (1998) shows that this theory is 
                                                 
6 The FSMA amends, among other laws: the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956, the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,the International Banking Act of 1978, the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, the Federal Reserve Act, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the National Bank Consolidation and Merger Act, and the Home 
Owners’ Loan Act. 
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robust even when markets are characterized by pure price competition. In a more 
recent study, Martinez (2002) develops a framework that measures the information 
asymmetry across banks. Martinez developed a borrower turnover measure that 
focuses on how changes in customer information affect the banks ability to compete. 
This framework differentiates between effects on bank profits stemming from the 
banks’ relative size versus those profits from superior information. On the other hand, 
information asymmetry between investors and bank managers may limit a bank’s 
ability to raise funds (Stein (1998)) or banks may have limited ability to process 
information or monitor loans (Gale (1993) and Almazan (1996)).These studies 
suggest that banks utilize private information to earn a profit and that any change in 
regulation or industry structure that affects the use or generation of private 
information will impact the banks’ ability to compete. 
Other researchers have evaluated the impacts of legislation changes on the 
financial services industry. Kashyap and Stein (1995), for instance, find that the 
lending behavior of banks seems to be quite sensitive to exogenous changes in 
monetary policy. Thakor (1996) finds that regulations that increase capital 
requirements for banks decrease the aggregate lending affecting a bank’s ability to 
earn profits. However, Stiroh and Strahan (2003) find the link between a bank’s 
relative performance and its subsequent market share growth strengthens significantly 
after deregulation as competitive reallocation effects transfer assets to better 
performers. They conclude that earlier regulation of U.S. banks blunted this market 
mechanism and seriously hindered the competitive process. 
The changes in government regulations have led to dynamic changes in the 
financial industry structure. Berger and Humphrey (1992) and Rhoades (1993) both 
document significant structural and organizational changes in the banking industry 
following regulation amendments. However, these industry changes have resulted in 
mixed results. DeYoung (1997) shows significant losses for acquiring U.S. 
commercial banks from 1984 through 1994. Peristiani (1997) finds substantial gains 
for acquiring banks following the consolidation and reconstructing during the 1980’s. 
9 
Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggests that the improvements in profit 
efficiency can be linked to improved diversification of risks. Berger and Mester 
(2003) concludes that industry diversification allows institutions to make additional 
high-risk, high-expected return investments without additional productivity declines 
during the 1990s. 
The bank holding company conglomerates are able to navigate the restrictions 
and geographical limitations of bank legislation. Bank holding company activity in 
states with limitations on intrastate branching allowed these companies to diversify 
into non-banking industries. Bank Holding Company (BHC) diversification decreases 
the company’s firm-specific risk while unaffecting its systematic risk.7 However, the 
diversification is not the only factor affecting a Bank Holding Company’s firm-
specific risk. The uncertainty of the individual components of a BHC’s assets, 
leverage, and liabilities influence it stock returns. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) finds 
that larger BHCs are able to operate with higher leverage and engage in riskier 
lending practices without increasing overall risk because of their diversification 
advantage. Similarly, Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest that better 
diversification allows the merged banks to hold riskier and more profitable portfolios. 
These findings suggest that diversification may be an important motivation for bank 
consolidation. Measuring the performance of BHCs following geographic banking 
deregulation, Liang and Rhoades (1991) shows that larger BHCs can take advantage 
of wide branch networks to more effectively diversify loan portfolios.  
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
(IBBEA) eradicated the Bank Holding Company Act restrictions and permitted 
bilateral agreements among states made expansion across states by bank holding 
companies possible.8 Examining these two banking deregulation legislations, Clarke 
(2004) finds a significant linkage does not exist between banking markets as defined 
                                                 
7 Under the United States law, a bank holding company is any entity that directly or indirectly owns, 
controls or has the power to vote 25% or more of a class of securities of a U.S. bank. 
8 Initially, most states' bilateral agreements permitted entry only from states in a surrounding region, 
with the boundaries of the region determined by the passing of state law. These regions expanded to 
include more states. Some states even passed state legislation allowing national interstate banking.  
10 
by deregulation and economic growth in the state. Thus, diversification due to 
deregulation appears to have no influence the economy. The Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999 allows banks the opportunity to expand into non-banking 
financial activities increasing financial service industry consolidation. This 
consolidation will enhance diversification, however, the resulting change in 
shareholder value will depend on the extent to which consolidation is accompanied by 
changes in banks’ activities.  
 
Literature on the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
of 1980 
In March of 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (DIDMCA) was enacted to eliminate the distinctions among different 
types of depository institutions9 and remove interest rate limitations on deposit 
accounts. Essentially, this deregulation of the Glass Steagall Act allowed credit 
unions and savings and loan firms to offer checkable deposits, thus competing with 
commercial and savings banks for customer deposits. The DIDMCA has two main 
sections, Title 1 and Title 2. Title 1, the Monetary Control Act, extends the monetary 
reserve requirements to all U.S. banking institutions.10 The Depository Institutions 
Deregulation Act of 1980, Title 2, eradicated the Federal Reserve deposit interest rate 
ceilings. 
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act was 
passed to deal with the problems facing depository institutions. Due to the high 
interest rate level experienced in the United States, the depository institutions were 
forced to pay higher rates to attract consumer funds than the rates they were earning 
on their portfolios of assets. The DIDMCA allowed depository institutions to relax 
                                                 
9 The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act defines depository institutions as 
banks, savings banks, Savings and Loans firms and credit unions. 
10 The mandatory reserve requirements that banks keep in non-interest earning accounts at Federal 
Reserve Banks were lowered. State chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve 
System and thrift institutions were required to maintain reserve account balances. And the mandatory 
reserves requirements for all depository institutions were phased in over an eight-year period ending in 
1988. 
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deposit rate limitation, enabling these institutions to earn higher returns due to the 
reduced applicability of the state usury laws. Depository institutions were now 
permitted to lend money and charge borrowers exorbitant interest rates. The new 
lending powers were, however, extended to only individuals and nonprofit 
organizations and not to businesses. Allen and Wilhelm (1988) states that bankers 
recognize the desirability of regulatory simplification among depository institutions, 
such as homogeneous reserve requirements, and the abolition of interest rate ceilings 
on deposits. However, James (1983) finds that bank deregulation of deposit rate 
ceilings resulted in gains for credit unions and savings and loans but losses for 
commercial banks. Similarly, Allen and Wilhelm (1988) find evidence that the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act provided a wealth 
transfer from non-federal Reserve System member banks and savings and loans to 
Federal Reserve member banks. Cornett and Tehranian (1989) find that the DIDMCA 
banking deregulation benefited stockholders of large banks and savings and loans but 
produced negative abnormal stock returns for small banks. Timberlake (1985) 
suggests that the DIDMCA increased the powers of the Federal Reserve System, 
benefiting large established banking institutions. The implementation of the 
DIDMCA made it possible for depository institutions to compete for funds regardless 
of the level of interest rates in the economy. However, Cornett and Tehranian (1990) 
states that the authority for Federal Reserve member institutions to make risky loans 
was expanded, which ended up with the savings and loan crisis in 1985.  
 
Literature on Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
Prior to 1994, banks and bank holding companies were prohibited from 
acquiring banks across state lines. The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act of 1994 extends interstate banking in two formal steps. First, as of September 
1995, bank holding companies were allowed to acquire banks in any state. Secondly, 
in June 1997, holding companies were able to convert out-of-state bank affiliates to 
branches of the lead bank. However, bank acquisitions and conversions are subject to 
the approval of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977, concentration 
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limits and state laws. Previous research indicates that financial reforms, such as the 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, have had important effects 
on the structure of banking markets. Brook, Hendershott and Lee (1998) document a 
value gain of $85 billion for the financial industry post ratification on the IBBEA. 
However, Carow and Kane (2002) state that the passing of the IBBEA resulted in the 
redistribution of wealth rather than the creation of value. Carow and Kane (2002) find 
that returns are positive for some financial sectors and negative for others.  
Although Amel and Liang (1992) and Calem (1994) both find that banking 
market structure changed little after the ratification of the Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act , Amel and Liang (1992) find significant entry into local 
markets after intra-state branching restrictions of the BHCA were repealed. Calem 
(1994) show that many small banks are acquired and incorporated as branches into 
large bank holding companies after branching reform. McLaughlin (1994) finds that 
multi-bank holding companies convert existing and acquired bank subsidiaries into 
branches following the IBBEA. Furthermore, Savage (1993) finds that over the 1980-
1993 period the market share of large banks grew, while concentration at both the 
state and national level rose. Jayatne and Strahan (1996) also show that banking 
deregulation increased state-level growth and Jayatne and Strahan (1998) show that 
deregulation increased efficiency resulting from costs and prices of banking services. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that larger more efficient banks emerge post-inter-state 
deregulation. In addition, increases in size are associated with better inter-state 
diversification (Demsetz and Strahan (1995)). Stiroh and Strahan (2003) find these 
beneficial results are the result of competitive dynamics. Nippani and Green (2002) 
show that bank performance improved in the post-IBBEA period, but when they 
controlled for general economic conditions and interest rate movements, the impact of 
IBBEA on bank performance appears to be insignificant. However, based on several 
studies (Demsetz and Strahan (1995), Jayatne and Strahan (1996, 1998), Nippani and 
Green (2002), Stiroh and Strahan (2003)), deregulation of the financial services 
industry appears to be beneficial to only some sections of the industry.  
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 Literature on the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 
Prior to 1999, consolidation occurred primarily through intra-industry mergers 
and acquisitions. Under the FSMA, while the intra-industry M&A activity will 
continue, much of the consolidation will be in the form of cross-industry mergers 
involving banks, brokerage firms, and insurance companies. There is an extensive 
research literature on the motives for and consequences of consolidation resulting 
from the ratification of the Financial Services Modernization Act. According to 
Covington and Burling (1999) and Macey (2000) the FSMA provides commercial 
banks with strong incentives to expand into investment banking and insurance 
services, investment banks into commercial banks and insurance companies, and 
insurance companies into investment banking. Barth, Brumbaugh and Wilcox (2000) 
investigate the major provisions of the Act. They argue that the Act favors big banks. 
Brewer et al. (1988), Wall et al. (1993), and Boyd et al. (1993) hypothesize that banks 
will receive greater benefits from involvement in insurance activities than from 
participation in other non-banking activities, without increasing their organizational 
risk significantly. Kwan and Laderman (1999) also find similar results after surveying 
the literature on the effects of combining banking and non-bank financial activities on 
banking organizations’ risk and return. They conclude that expanding banking 
services to include insurance and investment activities can provide diversification 
benefits to banking organizations. Whalen (2000) shows that banking firms are likely 
to improve, or at least not unfavorably alter their risk/return opportunities by 
engaging in both banking and insurance activities-particularly life insurance 
underwriting activities. Alternatively, Kwast (1989) and Apilado et al. (1993) find 
that adding underwriting services will lead to an increase in individual bank risks and 
little reduction in total risk.  
Several studies examine the effect of the passage of the FSMA on the return 
of financial services firms. Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) examine the legislative events 
leading up to and the passage of the FSMA on the stock returns of banks, brokerage 
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firms, and insurance companies. They find that the impact is positive for all 
institutions. Bank gains are positively related to size (bank assets) and capitalization 
level (customer deposits). Brokerage firms and insurance companies gain regardless 
of their size. Insurance firms gain regardless of their capital position, but brokerage 
firms’ gains are inversely related to their capital position. Alternatively, Carow and 
Heron (2002), find insignificant returns for banks, negative returns for foreign banks, 
thrifts and finance companies and positive returns for investment banks and insurance 
companies. Similarly, Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins (2002) document strong 
positive response among investment banks and insurance companies and insignificant 
response among commercial banks. Neale and Peterson (2003) show that the market 
reactions to key events related to passing of the FSMA for insurance companies are 
positive. Akhigbe and Whyte (2004) report that the systematic risk of all types of 
financial institutions decreases after the FSMA, while the total and unsystematic risks 
increase for banks and insurance companies and decreases for investment firms. More 
recently, Yildirim, Kwag and Collins (2006) find that investment banks and insurance 
firms are better positioned to exploit the benefits of product-line diversification 
opportunities allowed by the legislation compared to commercial banks that 
experience no significant market reactions to the key legislative events leading to the 
passage of the FSMA.  
 
Literature Review on Non-Financial Corporate Acquisitions and Conglomerates 
The financial literature advances two main strands of research related to the 
motivations for mergers and acquisitions. The first commonly found is the synergistic 
effects from the combination of targets and acquirers. The synergistic hypothesis can 
take form in three distinct ways. One, the target shareholders as well as the bidder 
shareholders would benefit from the merger if the bidders’ management can 
effectively manage the combination of the two firms more efficiently than the target 
management can manage the target firm. Two, a target firm can benefit from being 
absorbed by an acquirer, gaining access to outside funds at the lowest attainable rates. 
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Finally, the reduction of risk through the merger of target and acquirer is the third 
justification of an acquisition. Even if the target and acquirer are in unrelated 
industries, the risk surrounding their earnings streams will be reduced when these 
earnings streams are pooled.  
The second hypothesis advanced related to the motivations for mergers and 
acquisitions is the agency cost hypothesis. The agency cost hypothesis asserts that 
managers pursue pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards that are closely related to the 
growth rate of their firm. Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) both assert that the power 
and prestige associated with managing a larger firm may lead to firm diversification. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) maintain that managerial compensation is related to firm 
size. Amihud and Lev (1981) note that diversification also reduces the risk of 
managers’ undiversified personal portfolios. Finally, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) state 
that diversification helps make the manager indispensable to the firm.  
Several empirical studies have investigated the validity of both the synergy 
hypothesis and the agency cost hypothesis. Initially, Mandelker (1974) finds a 
positive 0.6% abnormal return of merged firms from a month after through 12 months 
after the effective merger date. Empirical results by Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) 
show positive but statistically insignificant total dollar gains of $17.2 million to 
acquirers and targets in 162 tender offers. They also found that the average 
percentage change in total value of the combined target and acquirer firms is a 
significant 10.5%. Asquith (1983) and Eckbo (1983) report slightly positive, but 
statistically insignificant, abnormal returns. Servaes (1991) supports the notion that 
abnormal returns are higher when well managed, high q firms take over poorly 
managed low q firms. Finally, Chevalier (1999) finds that the market reacts positively 
to the announcement of diversification mergers. This evidence indicates that changes 
in corporate control increase the combined market value of assets of the acquiring and 
target firms. 
In stark contrast, there is a body of research that states that acquisitions are 
negative present value investments. Dodd (1980) finds a significant abnormal return 
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of -1.09% for 60 acquirers on the day before and the day of the first public 
announcement of the merger, indicating that merger bids are, on average, negative net 
present value investments for acquirers. Similarly, Malatesta (1983) reports an 
average loss of about $28 million in the period four months before through the month 
of announcement of the merger outcome. He finds significant negative abnormal 
post-outcome returns of -13.7% for mergers. Recently, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf 
(2002) found that acquiring firms experience a reduction in excess value following 
the acquisition. They state that the addition of a poor performing target firm explains 
most of the decline in value.  
Several papers discuss the effects of diversification on firm value. Stein 
(1997) suggests that conglomerates transfer capital from divisions with lower growth 
opportunities to those with higher growth opportunities but facing capital restrains. 
Thus, the Stein hypothesis suggests that internal capital market benefits the 
conglomerate. Alternatively, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) suggests that in a two-tier 
agency model, headquarters executives will over-allocate capital to rent-seeking 
divisional managers, therefore destroying firm value. 
There is a general consensus in the empirical literature validating the losses 
resulting from diversification. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Lang and Stulz 
(1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), and Lamont and Polk (2001) 
document significant value losses associated with diversification related acquisitions. 
Similarly, Loughran and Vijh (1997) finds that acquirer stock returns, on average, are 
smaller than matching stock returns in cases where a merger is made and stock is 
used for payment. Empirical results by Rau and Vermaelen (1998) also show that 
acquirers in mergers underperform in the three years following the acquisition.  
 The theory that investors overreact to anticipated and unanticipated 
information, resulting in exaggerated movements in stock prices have been used to 
explain the post-acquisition performance of acquirers. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) 
establishes the stock market overreaction hypothesis that asserts that stock prices take 
temporary fluctuations away from their fundamental values due to investor optimism 
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and pessimism. Numerous studies find evidence for stock price overreaction. 
DeBondt and Thaler (1987) document that over and underperforming firms exhibit 
extreme price performance over long-term periods. Fama (1991) state that part of the 
response of prices to information announcements occur slowly over time. Studies 
analyze the differential riskiness of over and underperforming firms. Chan (1988) and 
Ball and Kothari (1989) argue that differences in risk can explain the abnormal 
performance of these firms. These studies are evidence of overreaction to the 
accumulation of information. Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) provide evidence 
which suggests that differential risk cannot explain the asymmetric overreaction of 
under and over performing firms. However, Conrad and Kaul (1993) report that most 
of the long-term overreaction reported in DeBondt and Thaler (1985) can be 
attributed to a combination of the bid-ask spread effect and the use of price rather 
than returns to calculate cumulative abnormal returns. 
The overreaction excess returns following acquisitions might be due to the 
change in the type of stockholders owning the company (Black and Scholes (1974) 
and Shefrin and Statman (1984). Stiglitz (1989) hypothesize that the overreaction is 
caused by speculative trading. One might expect similar overreaction for acquiring 
financial service industry firms following the ratification of the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999, especially since these merged firms will form new 
financial conglomerates and the novelty and uncertainty of such a firm can lead to 
investor speculation. 
The consolidation efforts of commercial banks can provide insights into the 
true value of an acquisition and the benefits conglomerates receive from diverse 
divisions. Financial services industry acquisitions provide an empirical laboratory 
with relatively little asymmetric information or moral hazard compared to industrial 
firms in which the aforementioned hypotheses can be tested. Therefore, banking 
industry acquisitions provide an opportunity to test an aspect of the synergy 
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hypothesis11 (Mandelker (1974)), , and agency cost hypotheses (Jensen (1986)) and 
provide new insights about the effects of diversifying acquisitions (Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1990)). I use the reorganization of banks to comprehensively examine 
the value of an acquisition. Specifically, I quantify and then examine the determinants 
of the returns of the various banking reformation combinations.  
This study contributes to the debate on bank returns post-FSMA, by 
examining the consolidation options of banks following the ratification of the FSMA. 
Specifically, I compare the market reactions of the consolidation options; bank 
mergers with 1) banks, 2) investment firms or 3) insurance companies. Additionally, I 
analyze the returns post-FSMA using competing hypotheses; efficiency hypothesis 
and spillover hypothesis. Finally, I examine the acquisition premium to see if bank 
managers pay premium for financial service industry diversification.   
 
Hypotheses Development: Efficiency Hypothesis versus Spillover Hypothesis 
In this section, I present a set of sub-hypotheses under two broad hypotheses, 
efficiency and product-market spillover hypotheses, to explain the cross-sectional 
variation in stock market returns of banks that acquire financial services companies. 
The efficiency hypothesis states that acquiring banks purchase other financial service 
industry companies because the acquiring bank can manage the combination of the 
two firms more efficiently than the target management can manage the target firm. 
Therefore, the returns to the acquiring banks are partly driven by the acquirer’s ability 
to utilize the targets’ existing assets in a more efficient and effective manner. To test 
the efficiency hypothesis, I implement both of the banking profit efficiency measure 
utilized by Berger (1993) and Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000) as well as 
the operating efficiency measure developed by Harris and Robinson (2002).  
The product market spillover hypothesis states that the acquirers’ post-
acquisition stock market returns are related to the acquirers’ ability to cross market its 
products and services to a more diverse client base, which now includes the clients of 
                                                 
11 In relation to the banking industry, the synergy hypothesis is defined as the synergistic use of 
information on clients of both the target and the acquirer. 
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the newly acquired target firm. Similarly, the target’s products and services can be 
marketed to the acquirer’s clients. Thus, according to the product market spillover 
hypothesis, the acquirers’ returns primarily depend on the banks’ diversification of 
customers, products and services.  
The efficiency hypothesis and spillover hypothesis are distinctly different. The 
influence behind the efficiency hypothesis is the gains from exploiting economies of 
scale. The efficiency hypothesis centers around the cost function of a firm in that it 
primarily captures the reduction of cost resulting from increase in efficiency. These 
operational efficiencies could result from a variety of “synergies” including a 
reduction in production or redistribution cost, vertical integration and adoption of 
more efficient production or organizational technology. The spillover hypothesis 
captures the gains from improvements in financial standing that result from increased 
profits. The changes in the financial structure and standing of the acquirer or the 
combined firm resulting from excess sales, cash/cash flow and financial leverage will 
arise because of spillover from one division into other divisions.12 Specifically, the 
spillover hypothesis states that the acquiring financial institution purchases a target 
financial company to cross market its products and services to a more diverse client 
base. The implications of each hypothesis are very different. The efficiency 
hypothesis is different in that it implies that the new consolidated financial entity will 
be able capture sustainable efficiencies resulting from economies of scale, whereas 
the spillover hypothesis implies that spillover benefits will disappear once the 
acquirer has completed the cross-marketing of its products and services to the 
expanded client base.  
 
Efficiency Hypothesis 
Efficiency gains from exploiting economies of scale are often cited as a 
motivation for financial services industry consolidation (Mester (1993), Berger and 
                                                 
12 For instance, the relatively low correlation between the cash flows of a regular bank and those of a 
target insurance firm will reduce the probability of default and, therefore, lead to increased debt 
capacity.  This is the coinsurance argument of Lewellen (1971)).  The latter may then be exploited to 
increase the combined firm’s revenues.  
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Hannan (1998), Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999)). Using data from the 1990’s, 
Berger and Mester (1997) suggest that there may be substantial scale economies even 
for the largest banks. They suggest that these results are due in part to technological 
advancement. Alternatively, several studies find little evidence of substantial 
economies or diseconomies of scale within banking (Kellner and Mathewson (1983) 
and Mester (1987)), securities (Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987)) or insurance 
industries (Mester (1993)). These findings suggest that losses, or at least no gains in 
efficiency, will result from banking industry consolidation. Consistent with these 
findings, Altunbas, Molyneux, and Thornton (1997) find that simulated pro forma 
mergers between banks in the European Union are more likely to increase costs rather 
than decrease them. However, Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993) and Berger, 
Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (1999) find that joint production within both banking and 
insurance companies is more efficient for some firms and specialization is more 
efficient for others, depending on the size of the firm.  
In the United States, domestic banks are on average slightly less cost efficient 
than foreign banks by 2.8% of costs (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999)). This 
finding suggests that diversification reduces costs whereas specialization increases 
cost. Berger et al. (1999) conclude that the higher expenses are more likely incurred 
to produce a greater quality and/or variety of financial services that generate 
substantially greater revenues. Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000) find that 
foreign banks are less efficient on average than domestic banks, suggesting that 
efficiency considerations may limit the global consolidation of the financial services 
industry and leave substantial market share for domestic institutions. As it relates to 
industry consolidation, Berger and Humphrey (1992) and Pilloff and Santomero 
(1998) find that acquiring banks appear to be more cost efficient, on average, than 
their banking industry peers. These cost efficiencies could result from a variety of 
“synergies” including a reduction in production or redistribution cost, vertical 
integration and adoption of more efficient production or organizational technology 
(Jensen and Ruback (1984)). In light of the above discussion, I hypothesize that the 
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post-consolidation returns of the consolidated entity are positively related to the 
efficiency of the acquiring bank. Furthermore, I hypothesize that the post-
consolidation returns are increasing in the difference between the efficiency of the 
acquirer and the target. Due to the difficulty of realizing efficiency gains across 
diverse industry divisions, I also hypothesize that the post-consolidation returns of the 
new financial services entity will be larger when the bank acquires other bank(s) 
relative to when it acquires an investment bank or insurance company. 
 
Product Market Spillover Hypothesis 
The basis of the product market spillover hypothesis is that banks pay 
substantial premiums to acquire financial corporations so that the acquiring financial 
company can cross market its products and services to a more diverse client base. 
This hypothesis posits that the acquirer would like to obtain other benefits from the 
acquisition other than just the income arising from improving the efficiency of the 
target’s operations (Efficiency Hypothesis). This may result from a spillover effect to 
the acquirer’s other financial products and services due to the financial services 
industry acquisition. Whereas efficiency gains arise from the improved use of existing 
target assets in association with the acquirers’ assets, the product market spillover 
hypothesis holds that post-consolidation returns are expected to increase as a result of 
increased use of the existing client base of both the target and acquirer firms to 
market the consolidated entity’s services. For instance, after a bank acquires an 
insurance company the bank will cross-market its banking products to the new 
insurance clients while selling its insurance products to the bank’s clients. 
Most tests of the “Efficiency Hypothesis” use data on financial institutions 
from the 1990s, and it is possible that recent technological progress might have 
increased product “spillover” in financial services and thus created opportunities to 
improve returns through consolidation. A number of studies have examined firms that 
provide multiple products within the financial services industry with mixed results. 
Some research finds that consolidated banks and consolidated insurance companies 
22 
may lower costs by using one consolidated customer database and cross-selling their 
products. Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989) and Rajan (1996) state that 
information reusability may reduce cost when a universal bank acting as an 
underwriter conducts due diligence on a customer with whom it has had a lending or 
other relationship. Alternatively, Winton (1999) argues that diseconomies may arise 
from coordination and administrative costs when firms offer a broad range of 
products. Winton further states that these products are often outside the senior 
management’s area of competence. However, studies of the European Union’s 
universal banking system may not be good predictors of the United States’ 
consolidated financial services industry. Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) state 
that commercial banking and underwriting in the banking-oriented continental Europe 
of the past bears little resemblance to commercial banking and underwriting activities 
in market-oriented financial systems as in the United States. The following sub-
hypotheses explain and define the “product market spillover” hypothesis. 
 
 Cash /Cash Flow 
Lewellen (1971) and Travlos (1987) state that the merger of two firms that do 
not possess perfectly positively correlated cash flows reduces the default risk of the 
new firm, therefore, increasing the value of the combined firm above the sum of the 
values of the individual firms. Along the same line, Stein (1997) suggests that the 
gains to conglomerates that transfer assets from one division to another stem from the 
conglomerate’s ability to finance positive net present value projects of divisions with 
growth opportunities and low cash flow. However, there is an internal capital market 
theory that suggests that the allocation of assets within diversified firms may be 
suboptimal. Scharfstein and Stein (1997) suggest that executives over-allocate capital 
to rent-seeking divisional managers, therefore destroying firm value. The finding of 
Lamont and Polk (2001) also suggest wasteful spending or cross-subsidization that 
reduces cash flow. Similarly, banks may acquire target financial services companies 
to subsidize the other products and services the bank offers. Thus, the operating 
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income earned from the target companies are utilized to finance the operation of other 
divisions. Hence, I hypothesize that the returns to the acquirer are positively related to 
the change in the cash holding and cash flows of the consolidated firm.  
 
 Financial Leverage 
Palepu (1986) finds that the probability of becoming an acquisition target 
decreases with the company’s debt level. Low debt levels are viewed by the acquirers 
as the target’s management inability to maximize firm value. Thus, upon acquisition 
the acquirer can increase debt levels and obtain additional assets which in turn may 
generate extra value. Palepu also finds that the increase in debt capacity from the 
acquisition of a low debt target reduces the risk of the acquirer’s default. In the highly 
competitive financial services industry, the acquirers’ access to additional funding 
can lead to a competitive advantage over capital-constrained firms. 
Another explanation for the acquisition of targets with under-utilized debt 
capacity comes from Lewellen (1971). Lewellen argues that diversified firms have 
larger tax shields from interest deductions in addition to debt capacity. Majd and 
Myers (1987) assert that conglomerate firms pay less in taxes than their divisions 
would pay separately because of the tax code’s asymmetric treatment of gains and 
losses. The conglomerate division that experiences losses has a higher probability of 
receiving tax benefits from the losses than if it was an independent firm. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that the returns of the acquirer are positively related to the financial 
leverage of the joint firm resulting from the debt capacity and tax shield benefits of a 
target.  
 
Excess Sales 
The efficiency hypothesis suggests that assets flow to their most efficient use. 
A new management team replaces under-performing incumbent management and 
manages the acquired assets more efficiently. If this is the case, then the acquiring 
firm’s net sales should rise post-acquisition. However, I am proposing an alternative 
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explanation of any gains in the post-acquisition net sales. If the acquiring firm can 
realize informational and marketing economies, cross-marketing and developing 
products and services will increase sales. Thus the product-market spillover from one 
division into the other will have a drastic impact on sales. Hence, I hypothesize that 
the acquirers’ stock market returns are positively related to the change in sales of the 
acquiring firm. Given that increased sales can be a manifestation of increased 
efficiency, I use excess sales as a proxy to test the spill-over hypothesis. Excess sales 
is the residual sale change after accounting for the effect of efficiency on sales 
change. 
 
Data Description and Empirical Methodology 
Data Description 
To examine the wealth effects of FSMA, I collected all U.S. affiliated mergers 
and acquisitions for all financial firms from November 12, 1999 to December 31, 
2002 provided by the Worldwide M&A section of the SDC platinum database. I 
obtain information on i) the identities of the firms involved in the mergers or 
acquisitions, ii) the status of the transaction, iii) the nation of target firms for U.S. 
acquirers iv) the primary four digit SIC codes for both acquirers and targets, and v) 
the number of SIC codes that the acquirers and targets participate in. All acquirers 
must have three years of returns and accounting data for three years after the 
acquisition to be included in the database. There are 404 completed financial industry 
M&As where U.S. firms were acquirers of U.S. target post the ratification of the 
FSMA.  
As in Mamun, Hassan and Maroney (2005), I use the acquirers’ CUSIP as 
well as the SIC classification from COMPUSTAT to identify the commercial banks 
(SIC 6021 and 6022), brokerage firms (3 digit SIC code 620) and insurance firms (3 
digit SIC codes 631, 632, 633) to supplement the SDC platinum data with balance 
sheet information. The return information for this study comes from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes. I require these firms to have no missing 
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trading day returns for at least three consecutive years after the merger or acquisition, 
from November 12, 1999 to December 2005. The selection process reduced the 
sample to 353 U.S. financial institution acquisitions. Among these 353 transactions, 
273 were conducted by commercial banks acquiring other commercial banks, 58 
commercial banks merging with brokerage firms, and 22 commercial bank and 
insurance company mergers. There are a total of 194 distinct acquirers under study. 
In addition to returns, I also require a measure of bank efficiency. There are 
several ways to measure bank efficiency. These include estimated efficiencies 
(Berger and Mester, 2003) or linear programming efficiency measures (Wheelock and 
Wilson, 1999 Alam, 2001). Berger (1993) and Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell 
(2007) utilize the most widely cited banking profit efficiency measure using a 
distribution free random error method. To implement the distribution-free random 
error method, I estimate the profit function using data of 2214 banks with continuous 
and complete annual data for the seven-year period from 1999 through 2005. Using 
the results of these estimations, I calculate the profit efficiency for every financial 
institution with the distribution-free method, which distinguishes efficiency 
differences from random error by averaging the profit function residuals over time13. 
Specifically, the estimate of efficiency for each firm in a data set is determined as the 
difference between the average residual of the control sample and the residual of the 
firm in the sample. I use this profit efficiency measure to test the efficiency 
hypothesis, because it is a more comprehensive measure that includes both cost and 
income variables. The variables included in the profit efficiency estimation model are 
net income, net sales, cost of sales, earning before interest and taxes (EBIT) and non-
operating expenses. 
As an alternative measure of efficiency, I look to the manufacturing literature. 
Harris and Robinson (2002) define operational efficiency as the ratio of operational 
expenses of financial institutions to that of the assets of financial institutions. This 
                                                 
13 See Berger (1993) for a complete description of the distribution free random error efficiency 
measure. The general procedure for estimating efficiency using the distribution free method is to 
estimate input coefficients and random error term to calculate efficiency for each observation in the 
sample. 
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efficiency measure is defined in the broadest possible terms to include any effects that 
increase the consolidating firm’s existing shareholder value. I use operational 
efficiency as an ancillary measure to diagnose whether financial institutions’ returns 
are rooted in cost control (operational efficiency) or both cost and sales (distribution-
free profit efficiency) and to compare my results to those of the previous banking 
efficiency literature (Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2007)). However, while 
presenting both sets of results, I place greater weight on the analyses using the 
distribution-free profit efficiency measure. 
 
 
Methodology 
This paper attempts to explain the returns to financial services acquirers 
following the ratification of the FSMA using two competing hypotheses: efficiency 
hypothesis and product-market spillover hypothesis. I begin the analysis by 
examining the impact of efficiency on acquirers’ return. In order to provide some 
preliminary insight into whether the returns of financial institutions are the result of 
superior efficiency, and to evaluate the economic significance of this relationship, I 
estimate equations of the form: 
 
itittit eEfficiencyturn +Β= ++ 3,*13,Re                       
(1) 
 
where returns is the three-year aggregate return of bank i in the period immediately 
following its investment in an acquisition, Efficiency is a measure of bank i’s 
efficiency utilizing the distribution-free profit or operational efficiency variable. A 
statistically significant positive relationship between Return and Efficiency would be 
consistent with the efficiency hypothesis and the findings of Berger, DeYoung, 
Genay and Udell (2007). 
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I then use a multivariate regression model (MVRM) suggested by Yildrim, 
Kwag and Collins (2006) to examine the three-year returns of financial institutions 
post the passing of the FSMA. With the MVRM the effect of the acquisition on 
systematic industry risk and security returns can be simultaneously captured by 
adding a variable to account for the industry diversity variation. I add industry 
diversity variables to account for the variation in returns resulting from offering 
different industry services.    
 
The model proposed is: 
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where Return is the three-year aggregate return of bank i in the period immediately 
following its investment in an acquisition, Efficiency is a measure of bank i’s 
efficiency utilizing the distribution-free profit or operational efficiency variable 
discussed earlier. Bank/Non-bankMerger accounts for the diversity of the acquisition 
where the variables takes values of 0 for bank/ bank mergers and 1 for bank/ 
investment firm acquisitions and bank/ insurance company mergers.  
ReturnRisk is the monthly standard deviation of returns over 36 months 
multiplied by the square root of 36, resulting in the three-year risk in returns. The 
Spillover terms account for the three-year changes in the resulting firms financial 
characteristics, such as cash, cash flow, financial leverage, and excess sales 
standardized by the acquirers’ size. Cash, cash flow and financial leverage are 
reported in Compustat. ExcessSales is defined as the residual change after accounting 
for the effect of efficiency on change in net sales. After implementing the following 
regression: 
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 iii eofAcquirerEfficiencySales ++=Δ 10 βα          
(3) 
 
where Efficiency is a measure of acquiring bank i’s efficiency utilizing the 
distribution-free profit or operational efficiency variable,  I then use the output of this 
cross-sectional regression (equation 3) in the following model: 
 
ii ofAcquirerEfficiencySalessExcessSale
∧−Δ+= *βα  .      
(4) 
 
that is actual sales change less predicted sales change, where the estimation ofβ  ( β  
hat) is common across all acquirers. 
Finally, I use abnormal returns (AR) proposed by Asquith and Mullins (1983) 
to analyze the acquirers announcement day response. Announcement day returns are 
computed as  
 
jtti iti
RRAR ,1, , −=∑ −                       
(5) 
 
where Rt,i denotes the date t stock return of the acquiring firm i, Rt,j is the date t return 
of the equally weighted index of the financial service industry companies or the 
return of the equally weighted market model. 
 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics for financial institutions 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the main variables for the sample 
of 353 financial industry acquisitions. On average, the transaction value for financial 
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industry mergers is $477 million. Averaging across all bank-year observations, the 
average net asset of the acquirers is approximately $64 billion, while the targets’ 
average size is smaller, $3.12 billion. The mean financial statistics for the acquirers 
and targets are reported in column 1. It appears that the acquiring firms are in good 
financial standing with a mean net sales of $1.3 billion and return on assets (ROA) of 
1%. The average financial leverage is $30 billion. Finally, there is, on average, a 
positive annual cash flow for the acquiring firms of $154 million. The sample 
preliminary statistics and characteristics are similar to those reported in Berger and 
Mester (2003) and Akhigbe and Whyte (2001). 
 
 
 
All Bank Brokerage Insurance Difference Difference Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2)-(3) (2)-(4) (3)-(4)
Transaction Value 477.10 363.50 985.66 401.06 -622.16 -37.55 584.60
Number of Acquisitions 353 273 58 22
Number of Acquirers 194 145 36 13
Acquiror
Assets 63896.24 17530.08 52090.41 200774.77 -34560.34 *** -183244.69 ** -148684.36 *
Financial Leverage 30425.81 13169.26 38788.61 47018.21 -25619.35 -33848.95 * -8229.60
Operation Expense 313.16 245.66 579.05 2577.81 -333.39 *** -2332.15 *** -1998.75
Net Sales 1333.11 1080.23 5358.68 30.07 -4278.45 *** 1050.15 5328.61 *
Cash 1120.91 1107.45 9501.72 15.27 -8394.26 *** 1092.19 9486.45 *
Cash Flow 154.35 29.01 175.83 14.35 -146.82 *** 14.65 * 161.48 *
Return on Assets 1.01 1.04 1.03 1.33 0.00 -0.30 * -0.30
Return on Investment 9.42 9.96 9.67 14.88 0.29 -4.92 ** -5.21
Cost of Sales 993.41 593.07 1749.73 2785.04 -1156.66 *** -2191.97 * -1035.31
Non-Operating Expense 212.53 139.59 364.50 26.84 -224.92 * 112.75 * 337.66
Target
Assets 3129.77 2399.09 10993.88 60070.00 -8594.79 *** -57670.92 -49076.13
Table 1
This table presents the summary statistics for the sample of financial services industry acquisitions. The data are for all U.S. affiliated mergers and acquisitions 
for all financial firms from November 12, 1999 to December 31, 2002 provided by the Worldwide M&A section of the SDC platinum database. There are 353 
completed financial industry M&As where U.S. firms were acquirers of U.S. target post the ratification of the FSMA.The transaction value is the total purchase 
price the acquiring bank pays for other financial companies. Acquirer assets are the total assets of the acquirer during time of the acquisition. Acquirer financial 
leverage is the book debt to total assets during the time of the acquisition. The operation expense is the cost of goods sold for operations. Net sales is defined as 
the gross sales less returns, discounts and allowances. The acquirer cash is measured as the total book value of cash of the acquirer during the time of the 
consolidation. The acquirer cash flow is measured as the change in cash availability of the acquirer the year prior to the acquisition. The return of assets (ROA) 
is calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets during the time of the 
Description of Financial Industry Transactions
consolidation. Return on investment (ROI) is calculated by dividing net profits less taxes by total assets. The Cost of Sales (COS) is the cost of goods sold plus 
any expenses incurred in the selling and delivery of the product or service including the purchase of raw material and manufactured finished products. The non-
operating income expense is the expense incurred in performance of activities not directly related to the main business of the firm, such as the maintenance of 
buildings and equipment. Target assets are the total assets of the target during time of the acquisition. Columns 5, 6, and 7 summarizes the differences between 
the types of acquisition for the various acquirer and target characteristics. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Values 
are reported in millions.
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The mergers between two commercial banks are the largest sub-sample, 
having 145 mergers with the acquirer having an average $17.5 billion in assets and 
the target having $2.4 billion in assets. The smallest set of acquisitions are the 
commercial bank/ insurance company, with 13 acquisitions and a mean of $200 
billion of acquirer assets and target assets of roughly $60 billion. The assets of the 
average commercial bank that acquirers other commercial banks are approximately 
$34 billion lower than the acquirers’ assets of the commercial bank/ brokerage firm 
mergers and about $183 billion smaller than the commercial bank/ insurance 
company mergers. The financial leverage of the acquirer in commercial bank/ 
commercial banks mergers does not differ appreciably from the financial leverage of 
the brokerage firm acquisitions. The cost of sales are significantly larger for the 
commercial bank mergers than the brokerage firm or insurance company acquisitions. 
There is a significant difference (at the 0.01 level) between the mean net sales for 
commercial bank acquirers and acquirers in commercial bank/ brokerage firm 
mergers.  
 
 
Financial Services Industry M&A Transaction Value and Premium 
Table 2 presents the distribution of the transaction value by years and 
acquisition type. There is a slight decrease in the number of transactions from 2000 to 
2002 for the entire acquisition sample. The steadily decreasing number of financial 
industry acquisitions suggests that the industry has consolidated. However the 
number of commercial bank/ brokerage firm merger increased in the final year of the 
sample. This suggests that firms are recognizing the benefit of the commercial bank/ 
brokerage firm combination resulting in a trend of more combinations between 
commercial banks and brokerage firms.  I will more rigorously address this issue 
below. 
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Transaction Value Premium
Entire Sample Entire Sample
Section A N mean std deviation min max N mean std deviation min max
1999 21 389.613 1642.480 0.249 15925.201 21 0.200 0.274 0.004 0.363
2000 138 804.374 3685.289 0.400 33554.579 109 0.167 0.231 0.014 0.312
2001 112 364.615 1764.860 2.450 13132.151 81 0.158 0.195 0.028 0.356
2002 82 102.356 331.095 1.250 2870.000 64 0.188 0.102 0.008 0.324
All Years 353 477.098 2175.286 0.249 33554.579 275 0.172 0.194 0.004 0.363
Section B Bank / Bank Mergers Bank / Bank Mergers
1999 10 381.824 1746.206 0.249 15925.201 10 0.195 0.091 0.004 0.315
2000 105 509.420 2320.347 0.400 21084.873 84 0.166 0.068 0.039 0.285
2001 95 396.552 1877.969 3.200 13132.151 71 0.152 0.072 0.042 0.337
2002 63 67.553 598.490 1.700 2870.000 54 0.189 0.082 0.008 0.324
All Years 273 363.500 1748.023 0.249 21084.873 219 0.168 0.074 0.004 0.337
Section C Bank/Brokerage Firm Mergers Bank/Brokerage Firm Mergers
1999 9 479.293 822.157 5.000 3335.633 9 0.207 0.101 0.005 0.363
2000 24 1970.956 6918.171 2.200 33554.579 20 0.176 0.284 0.126 0.312
2001 10 146.199 320.674 4.750 1010.000 7 0.199 0.094 0.028 0.356
2002 15 272.635 43.249 1.250 507.508 9 0.194 0.126 0.031 0.304
All Years 58 985.657 3056.741 1.250 33554.579 45 0.189 0.186 0.005 0.363
Section D Bank/ Insurance Company Mergers Bank/ Insurance Company Mergers
1999 2 6.910 3.889 4.160 9.660 2 0.197 0.151 0.021 0.235
2000 9 910.232 1340.129 1.400 2449.297 5 0.158 0.051 0.014 0.176
2001 7 81.350 99.844 2.450 193.600 3 0.206 0.042 0.174 0.308
2002 4 11.963 10.441 2.500 26.500 1 0.103 n.a. 0.103 0.103
All Years 22 401.055 582.255 1.400 2449.297 11 0.173 0.062 0.014 0.308
Transaction Value Differences Premium Differences
Section E
All Years -622.156 -0.021**
Section F
All Years -37.555 -0.005*
Section G
All Years 584.602 0.016
Bank/ Bank Mergers vs. Bank/ Insurance Company Mergers Bank/ Bank Mergers vs. Bank/ Insurance Company Mergers
Bank/  Brokerage Firm Mergers vs. Bank/ Insurance Company 
Mergers
Bank/  Brokerage Firm Mergers vs. Bank/ Insurance Company 
Mergers
Bank/ Bank Mergers vs. Bank/ Brokerage Firm Mergers Bank/ Bank Mergers vs. Bank/ Brokerage Firm Mergers
Table 2
Financial Services Industry M&A Transaction Value and Premium
This table reoprts the descriptive statistics for the sample of financial services industry acquisitions by year from November 12, 1999 to December 31, 2002. 
There are 353 completed financial industry M&As where U.S. firms were acquirers of U.S. target post the ratification of the FSMA.The transaction value is 
the total purchase price the acquiring bank pays for other financial companies. Premiun is defined as the price paid for the target (transaction value) minus 
accounting book value of target's equity, this quantity, divided by the transaction value. Section A, B, C and D reports the descriptive statistics for A) the 
entire sample, B) commerical bank mergers with other commerical banks, C) commerical bank mergers of brokerage firms, and D) commerical bank mergers 
with insurance companies. Sections E through G reports the transaction value and premium differences for the various M&A sub- samples. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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The merger premium is also described in Table 2. I define premium as the 
price paid for the target (i.e., transaction value) - accounting book value of target’s 
equity, this quantity, divided by the transaction value. Section A of Table 2 shows 
that on a year-by-year basis the acquisition premium ranges from 15.8% to 20% for 
the entire sample. The premiums for the commercial bank/ commercial bank mergers 
are similar with a low of 15.2% and a high of approximately 19.5%.  The range of 
premiums over the sample period for commercial bank/brokerage firm mergers is 
slightly higher with a low of 17.6% and a high of 20.7%. However, the average range 
of the premium paid in mergers between commercial banks and insurance companies 
is significantly lower with a minimum of 10.3% and a maximum of 20.6%. For all 
sub-samples, acquirers paid the highest premium in 1999, the last year of the decade-
long bull market when hubris would have most likely influenced these deals (Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998)).  Subsequently, there is a sharp drop off in the premium paid. 
Note that the fall in the market and, hence, decline in the market value of equity of 
the target cannot completely explain the drop in premium because acquirers could 
continue to pay the same premium over the reduced value of the equity of the target. 
In addition, Section F of Table 2 reports that acquiring banks pay a significantly 
larger premium to acquirer brokerage firms than to purchase other commercial banks. 
These findings suggests that by paying a substantial premium acquirers are expecting 
to recognize gains potentially in the form of increased efficiency or their ability to 
cross-market their various products and services.  
The size of the transaction is likely to be correlated with the financial standing 
of the acquiring firm.  That is, larger, more efficient successful banks are more likely 
to purchase competing banks or alternative financial service companies whereas 
smaller banks will become targets. Table 3 reports the correlations between the 
acquirers’ characteristics and target total assets at the time of the acquisition. The 
correlation between acquirer total assets and target total assets is 34%. This suggests 
that the two variables may play different roles in the determination of the premium 
paid in the acquisitions. However, the correlations between acquirer total assets and 
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financial leverage, acquirer net sales and acquirer cash flow are all larger than 97%. 
This suggests that the acquirers’ characteristics explain similar aspects of the 
acquirers’ performance and transaction value, which would result in multicollinearity 
in multivariate regression analysis if not taken into account. 
Acquiror Acquiror Acquiror Acquiror Acquiror Acquiror Acquiror
Target Total Acquiror Total Financial Operation Acquiror Net Acquiror Cash Return on Return on Cost of Non Operating
Assets Assets Leverage Expenses Sales Cash Flow Assets Investment Sales Income Expense
Target Total 1 0.3395 0.3884 0.3086 0.3245 0.6213 0.7607 0.1435 -0.0456 0.2747 -0.3343
Assets (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0127) (0.4305) (<.0001) (<.0001)
353 353 347 347 347 350 350 335 332 348 305
Acquiror Total 1 0.9734 0.9631 0.9836 0.9710 0.9880 0.0897 -0.1051 0.8344 -0.9253
Assets (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4257) (0.3506) (<.0001) (<.0001)
353 341 342 343 341 342 332 329 342 305
Acquiror 1 0.9162 0.9561 0.9516 0.9657 0.0923 -0.1039 0.8592 -0.9363
Financial (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4127) (0.3558) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Leverage 347 339 341 345 342 331 327 330 302
Acquiror 1 0.9731 0.7239 0.9682 0.1187 -0.0871 0.7748 -0.8273
Operation (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1210) 0.2558 (<.0001) (<.0001)
Expenses 347 338 344 345 331 328 331 301
Acquiror Net 1 0.7816 0.9774 0.1103 -0.1221 0.8376 -0.9199
Sales (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1535) (0.1136) (<.0001) (<.0001)
347 338 337 326 315 332 302
Acquiror 1 0.8173 0.0260 -0.0646 0.7905 -0.8764
Cash (<.0001) (0.6062) (0.1999) (<.0001) (<.0001)
350 350 326 320 332 302
Acquiror 1 0.2272 -0.0806 0.7585 -0.8239
Cash (0.0155) (0.3980) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Flow 350 329 321 336 300
Acquiror 1 0.8287 0.0574 -0.8357
Return on (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Assets 335 328 331 301
Acquiror 1 0.0620 -0.8431
Return on (<.0001) (<.0001)
Investment 332 322 297
Acquiror 1 -0.9582
Cost of (<.0001)
Sales 348 305
Acquiror 1
Non Operating
Income Expense 305
Table 3
Correlation analysis of Financial Service Industry Acquisitions from 1999-2002
This table presents the correlations for the Financial Service Industry M&As varialbes of interest from November 1999 to December 2002. There are 353 completed financial industry M&As 
where U.S. firms were acquirers of U.S. target post the ratification of the FSMA. Target assets are the total assets of the target during time of the acquisition. .Acquirer total assets are the total 
assets of the acquirer during time of the acquisition. Acquirer financial leverage is the book debt to total assets during the time of the acquisition. The operation expense is the cost of goods sold for 
operations. Net sales is defined as the gross sales less returns, discounts and allowances. The acquirer cash is measured as the total book value of cash of the acquirer during the time of the 
consolidation. The acquirer cash flow is measured as the change is cash availability of the acquirer the year prior to the acquisition. The return of assets (ROA) is calculated as the ratio of net 
income to total assets during the time of the consolidation. Return on investment (ROI) is calculated by dividing net profits less taxes by total assets. The Cost of Sales (COS) is the cost of goods 
sold plus any expenses incurred in the selling and delivery of the product or service including the purchase of raw material and  
manufactured finished products. The non-operating income expense is the expense incurred in performance of activities not directly related to the main business of the firm, such as the 
maintenance of buildings and equipment. P-values are in parentheses.
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Financial Services Industry M&A Transaction Premium Regression 
In this section, I examine the cross-sectional variation in premiums for U.S. 
financial industry mergers and acquisitions. I use the merger premium to provide 
some insight into how managers of acquiring firms perceive the opportunity provided 
by the FSMA to expand into non-banking activities relative to expanding their 
banking product via the acquisition of other banks. If bank managers regard highly 
the ability to diversify, then the premium for doing so should increase as we move 
from bank/bank to bank/brokerage firm to bank/insurance mergers. That is, this 
hypothesis proposes a positive and increasing relationship between the merger 
premium and the “diversity” of the deal. This is because for a dollar of expected 
future revenues arising from the merger the present value is higher the least correlated 
are the cash flow streams of the acquirer and the target, which reduces the discount 
rate. An alternative hypothesis is that although managers may welcome the 
opportunity to diversify they may not be willing to pay the same premium to acquire 
non-core banking firms like brokerage and insurance firms, as they would to acquire 
other banks. This is because as they move away from their core competencies the 
level of asymmetric information increases with the diversity of the deal. Thus, the 
discount rate to be applied to a dollar of incremental revenues due to the deal 
increases. Therefore, this hypothesis predicts a positive premium that is declining in 
the diversity of the deal. It should be noted that management’s perception of the value 
of the diversity of the merger, as expressed by the relative sizes of the premiums need 
not correspond with the markets perception (as reflected in the announcement effect) 
of benefits of the merger. I examine the latter below. 
Table 4 presents results for the regression analysis. On average, the target 
firms’ capitalization is positively and significantly related to the acquisition premium. 
In addition, the premium can largely be attributed to the acquirers’ size. This is 
consistent with the finding by Moeller et al. (2004) that transaction value is 
significantly related to the size of the acquiring firm. The acquirers’ financial 
characteristics also explain the cross sectional variation in premium. The financial 
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leverage of the acquirer is negatively linked to acquisition premium. This is 
consistent with the literature that finds that the acquiring firms’ inability to finance 
the deal adversely affects the deal’s value (Palia, 1993, Moeller et al. 2004). The 
relationship between majority of the acquirers’ characteristics and the premium 
suggest that banks in good financial standing pay high transaction premiums to 
acquire competing banks, products, or services. 
Table 4 shows that bank/ brokerage firm mergers have higher premiums than 
bank/bank and that bank/insurance company mergers also have a greater premium 
than bank/bank mergers. These findings establish a positive and increasing 
relationship between the merger premium and the “diversity” of the acquisition. As in 
Benston et al. (1995) this study reports that banks bid more for merger partners that 
offer the potential for varying cash flows as a result of earnings diversification. 
model i model ii model iii model iv model v model vi model vii model viii model ix model x model xi
Variable Coefficienct Coefficienct Coefficienct Coefficienct Coefficienct Coefficienct Coefficienct Coefficienct Coefficienct Coefficienct Coefficienct
Intercept 1.850 2.040 1.540 1.839 2.113 1.934 2.003 1.649 1.204 1.593 1.953
(1.81)** (2.34)*** (1.37)* (1.74)** (2.53)*** (2.00)** (2.12)** (1.67)** (1.29)* (1.40)* (2.03)**
Bank/ Brokerage Firm Merger 0.675 0.592 0.847 0.721 0.613 0.882 0.573 0.681 0.610 0.701 0.685
(1.82)** (1.76)** (2.03)** (1.91)** (1.81)** (2.21)** (1.74)** (1.86)** (1.78)** (1.89)** (1.86)**
Bank/ Insurance Company Merger 0.122 0.109 0.131 0.126 0.113 0.158 0.099 0.119 0.111 0.123 0.117
(1.41)* (1.30)* (1.52)* (1.49)* (1.33)* (1.76)** (1.29)* (1.40)* (1.31)* (1.47)* (1.39)*
Target Assets 1.505 1.761 1.422 1.480 1.576 1.648
(1.76)** (1.93)* (2.02)*** (2.17)** (2.85)*** (2.27)**
Acquirer Assets 0.989 0.991 1.001 1.024 1.049 1.088 1.057
(2.40)*** (2.84)*** (3.00)*** (3.29)*** (3.43)*** (3.51)*** (3.49)***
Acquirer Financial Leverage -0.843 -0.747 -1.011 -0.924 -1.044 -0.786 -0.995
(-2.54)*** (-2.05)** (-2.72)** (-2.66)*** (-2.87)*** (-2.09)** (-2.81)***
Acquirer Net Sales 1.434 4.131 3.073 -2.847
(1.56)* (2.81)*** (2.43)*** (-1.89)**
Acquirer Cash 9.250 8.681 10.783
(1.59)* (1.50)** (1.74)**
Acquirer Cash Flow 20.965 19.383 18.459 14.557
0.87 0.66 0.58 0.50
Acquirer Return on Equity -12.860 -17.221 -10.349
-0.54 -0.96 -0.43
Acquirer Cost of Sales -17.645 -15.243 -18.676 -19.544 -16.675
(-1.49)* (-1.75)* (-1.39)** (-1.37)** (-1.64)**
Non-Operating Income Expense -25.776 -19.754 -20.654
-0.48 -0.31 -0.37
Year Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign.
Number of Observations Used 275 275 230 264 264 275 230 230 264 264 230
F Test 52.020 46.124 30.137 16.020 28.932 16.392 25.117 21.244 42.594 18.003 18.284
P-value 0.0041 0.0038 0.0039 0.0055 0.0040 0.0058 0.0040 0.0032 0.0032 0.0061 0.0069
Adjusted R2 0.832 0.791 0.584 0.494 0.601 0.459 0.598 0.581 0.850 0.480 0.607
Table 4
Financial Service Industry Premium Regression Analysis
This table presents the results of the regression model used to explain the cross-sectional variation in Financial Service Industry M&As premium.This table presents the results of the multivariante 
regression model, using the 275 Financial Service Industry acquisition premiums from November 1999 to December 2002 where the acquirer is a U.S. commerical bank and the target is either 1) a 
commerical bank, 2) brokerage firm or 3) an insurance company. The dependent variable is premiums paid for financial service industry companies. The key indepedent variable is "Industry 
Complexity" that takes the value of one for acquisition envolving either brokerage firms or insurance companies and zero for mergers between commerical banks. Other independent varialbes are: 
logarithm of assets for the acquirer assets during time of the acquisition; acquirer financial leverage is the book debt to total assets during the time of the acquisition; the operation expense is the cost of 
goods sold for operations; net sales is defined as the gross sales less returns, discounts and allowances; the acquirer cash is measured as the total book value of cash of the acquirer during the time of the 
consolidation; the acquirer cash flow is measured as the change is cash availability of the acquirer the year prior to the acquisition
; the return of assets (ROA) is calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets during the time of the consolidation; return on investment (ROI) is calculated by dividing net profits less taxes by total 
assets; the Cost of Sales (COS) is the cost of goods sold plus any expenses incurred in the selling and delivery of the product or service including the purchase of raw material and manufactured finished 
products; the non-operating income expense is the expense incurred in performance of activities not directly related to the main business of the firm, such as the maintenance of buildings and 
equipment; target assets are the logarithm of assets for the target during time of the acquisition; and year is a dichotomous variable representing the year of the acquisition. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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 Financial Services Industry Announcement-Day Returns 
This section examines the market response of the financial services industry 
mergers and acquisitions. Table 5 reports the abnormal returns on the announcement 
date of the financial services industry acquisitions. I report separate results for 
bank/bank, bank/brokerage, and bank/insurance firm mergers. I also evaluate the two 
days surrounding the acquisition date. In order to compare the announcement-day 
returns of acquiring financial services companies and appropriate benchmarks and to 
determine whether diversifying acquisitions add value for shareholders, I provide a 
comparison between the acquisition sample and those financial companies that did 
not experience mergers during the sample period as well as a comparison with the 
market returns. 
  The results in Table 5 (panel A) show that on the date of acquisition 
announcement the entire sample experiences no statistically significant response. This 
finding is consistent with those reported in Jensen and Ruback (1984). However, for 
both diversifying mergers, between commercial banks and brokerage firms and 
between commercial banks and insurance companies, there is a statistically 
significant increase in returns. Examining the pre- and post-announcement daily 
returns indicates that for mergers between commercial banks and brokerage firms, 
there is a significant increase in abnormal returns on the day of and day after the 
acquisition announcement of 10.2% and 1.9% respectively. In addition, commercial 
bank mergers with insurance companies have a positive abnormal market response of 
5.9% when compared to the market return (Table 5, panel B). These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that diversifying financial services industry 
acquisitions increase shareholder value. These results are consistent with those of 
Berger et al. (1999) that finds that joint production within both banking and insurance 
companies is more efficient for some firms. 
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denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
A: Financial Services Industry Benchmarks N Day -1 Day 0 Day +1
All Financial Services Mergers 353 0.004 0.053 0.032
(0.50) (1.04) (0.78)
Commercial Bank/ Commercial Bank Mergers 273 0.003 0.049 0.029
(0.39) (0.89) (0.71)
Commerical Bank/ Brokerage Firm Mergers 58 0.006 0.102 0.019
(1.01) (2.03)** (1.63)*
Commercial Bank/ Insurance Company Mergers 22 0.002 0.093 0.008
(0.42) (1.86)** (1.35)*
B. Market Benchmarks N Day -1 Day 0 Day +1
All Financial Services Mergers 353 0.0012 0.041 0.0042
(0.49) (1.31)* (0.98)
Commercial Bank/ Commercial Bank Mergers 273 0.0009 0.033 0.0037
(0.38) (1.28)* (0.88)
Commerical Bank/ Brokerage Firm Mergers 58 0.0006 0.084 0.0036
(1.03) (1.73)** (1.07)
Commercial Bank/ Insurance Company Mergers 22 0.0042 0.059 0.0082
(0.99) (1.67)** (1.19)
Table 5
Financial Services Industry M&A Announcement Day Returns
This table reports the number of financial services industry mergers and acquisitions announcements and the 
average announcement day returns between November 12, 1999 and December 31, 2002. Announcement dates 
for the financial services industry acquisitions are obtained from the SDC Platimum database. Announcement day 
returns are computed as ARi = Σi,t-1(Ri,t - Rt,,j) where Ri,t denotes the date t stock return of the acquiring firm i, R 
t,,j is the date t return of the equally weighted index of the financial service industry (Panel A) or the return of the 
equally weighted market model (Panel B).Each panel reoprts the abnormal returns for all financial services industry 
mergers, commercial bank acquisition of other commercial banks, the mergers between brokerage firms and 
commercial banks and the mergers of commercial banks with insurance companies. The t-statistics is reported in 
parentheses below the abnormal returns for the two day period surrounding the announcement date. Day 0 is the 
announcement date reported in SDC Platimum and Day -1 and Day +1 are the day prior to and after the 
announcement day, respectfully. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and *  
 
 
Financial Services Acquirers Efficiency Measurement and Correlations 
The efficiency measures of the acquiring financial institutions are not 
perfectly correlated. The correlation between the distribution-free profit efficiency 
and operational efficiency pre and post- acquisition are .61 and .69 respectively 
41 
(Table 6). This suggests that the two measures account for different aspects of 
banking efficiency. As discussed earlier, the distribution-free profit efficiency 
measure includes more inputs than the other efficiency measures, which may help 
explain the relatively low correlation between the distribution-free profit efficiency 
and operational efficiency measures. The mean estimates of 0.77 for distribution-free 
profit efficiency and 0.22 for operation efficiency are similar to those found by 
Berger and Hannan (1998) and Berger et al. (2007) of 0.70 and 0.77, respectively. 
 
 
Standard Operational
Variable Sample Size Mean Median deviation Efficiency
A. Pre-Acquisition
Acquirer 
Profit Efficiency 353 0.782 0.769 0.320 0.61
(0.00)
Operational Efficiency 328 0.228 0.220 0.113 1.00
Target
Profit Efficiency 331 0.602 0.587 0.221 0.73
(0.00)
Operational Efficiency 338 0.140 0.125 0.073 1.00
Difference (Acquirer-Target)
Profit Efficiency 325 0.18 **
Operational Efficiency 328 0.088 **
B. Post-Acquisition
Acquirer 
Profit Efficiency 353 0.774 0.762 0.307 0.69
(0.00)
Operational Efficiency 328 0.216 0.211 0.107 1.00
Profit
This table reoprts the descriptive statistics and correlations for the efficiency measures used to analyze the FSMA post-consolidation 
three-year returns. The profit efficiency measure was created using a distribution free random error method. To implement the 
distribution-free random error method, I estimate the profit function using data of 2214 financial institutions with continuous and 
complete annual data for the seven year period from 1999 through 2005. Using the results of these estimations, I calculate the profit 
efficiency for every financial institution with the distribution-free method, which distinguishes efficiency differences from random 
error by averaging the profit function residuals over time. Operational efficiency is defined as the ratio of operation expenses of 
financial institution to that of the assets of financial institution.
Table 6
Correlations of Efficiency Measures
Correlation (p-value)
1.00
1.00
Efficiency
1.00
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Univariate Efficiency Regression Results 
This section examines the impact the acquirers’ efficiency has on the post-
acquisition three-year return. Efficiency is often credited for the gains acquirers 
receive post acquisition although questions remain about the effects of intra-division 
supplementation for conglomerates (Lamont and Polk (2001)). The regression 
estimates in Table 7 confirm the results in the extant literature (e.g. Benston, 1989; 
Vennet, 2002 and Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell, 2007) that the three-year post-
consolidation returns to a financial institution can be explained by these firms having 
high levels of efficiency. Both measures of efficiency have a positive and statistically 
significant impact of the firm’s three-year post-acquisition return for the entire 
sample. As expected, the significance of the distribution-free profit efficiency 
measure is greater than the operational efficiency measure. This is expected because 
the distribution-free profit efficiency measure is a more comprehensive measure that 
includes both cost and income variables. As for the different types of financial 
services industry mergers, the three-year returns for mergers between commercial 
banks are significantly explained by both efficiency measures. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell, (2007). Both the 
profit efficiency and operational efficiency measure are statistically significant for the 
commercial bank/commercial bank mergers. However, both efficiency measures 
explain more about the commercial bank/insurance company mergers than bank/bank 
mergers as witnessed by the increase in r-squares. Finally, the profit efficiency 
measure is the only efficiency measure that is statistically significant for the 
commercial bank/brokerage firm and commercial bank/insurance company mergers. 
These results establish that banking efficiency impacts not only commercial bank 
returns, but also the returns of the combination firms of commercial bank/brokerage 
firms and commercial bank/insurance companies.  
Section A Commercial Bank/ Commercial Bank/ Commercial Bank/
Commercial Bank Brokerage Firm Insurance Company
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept -0.28294 -12.49*** -0.26941 -11.12*** -0.41198 -7.89*** -0.42549 -6.93***
Profit Efficiency 0.65096 13.93*** 0.63366 12.87*** 0.83151 12.45*** 0.84377 11.39***
Sample Size
F-Value
Adjusted R-Square
Section B
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept -0.20186 -9.29*** -0.20568 -8.91*** -0.18272 -2.54*** -0.18107 -2.27**
Operational Efficiency 0.3350655 1.94** 0.3377579 1.97** 0.4780727 0.49 0.1133 0.12
Table 7
Univariate Analysis of Financial Service Inudstry M&As with Efficiency Measures
Financial Service Industry
All
This table presents the results of the univariate regression model used to explain the cross-sectional variation in the post-FSMA three-year returns of 
Financial Service Industry acquirers. This table presents the results of the regression model, using the 353 Financial Service Industry acquisitions from 
November 1999 to December 2002 where the acquirer is a U.S. commerical bank and the target is either 1) a commerical bank, 2) brokerage firm or 3) an 
insurance company. The dependent varialbe is the post-FSMA three-year return for the consolidated financial firm. Section A reports the results for the 
Profit efficiency measure. The profit efficiency measure was created using a distribution free random error method. To implement the distribution-free 
random error method, I estimate the profit function using data of 2214 financial institutions with continuous and complete annual data for the seven year 
period from 1999 through 2005. Using the results of these estimations, I calculate the profit efficiency
for every financial institution with the distribution-free method, which distinguishes efficiency differences from random error by averaging the profit 
function residuals over time. Section B reports the results for the Operation efficiency measure. Operation efficiency is defined as the ratio of operation 
expenses of financial institution to that of the assets of financial institution. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
353
5.72
0.4230 0.4004
4.78
273 58
12.97
0.6895 0.7066
15.51
22
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Sample Size
F-Value
Adjusted R-Square 0.03280.0054
0.24
51257
3.66
0.01070.0098
3.75
328 20
0.01
 
Financial Services Industry Product Market Spillover Measurement 
The three-year post-consolidation change in the acquirers’ financial 
characteristics standardized by the acquirers’ total assets are utilized to measure spillover. 
Table 8 offers summary statistics of the main variables used to define product market 
spillover. Averaging across all acquirer-year observations, the ratio of excess sales to 
total assets has significantly increased over the three-year period, by 5.7 percentage 
points. Similarly, the change in the operating income to total assets ratio is substantial as 
indicated by the statistically significant increase of 6.6 percentage points over the sample 
period. The acquiring financial institutions are also recognizing efficiency gains. The cost 
of sales is statistically significantly lower three years following the acquisition. The 
results for the three-year post-acquisition change in cash flow are significantly larger, 
increasing by 6.6 percentage points. These results are the first indication that financial 
services acquirers are receiving benefits resulting from product market spillover.   
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Standardized Variables n t t+3
Panel A: Spillover Hypothesis Variables
          Cash 346 0.0467 0.0551 0.0085
          Cash Flow 346 0.0149 0.0807 0.0659 **
          Financial Leverage 347 0.8952 0.8290 -0.0663 *
          Excess Sales 320 0.0659 0.1229 0.0570 ***
          Cost of Sales 321 0.0549 0.0375 -0.0174 *
          Non-Operating Income Expe 305 0.0091 0.0421 0.0330 **
Panel B: Control Variables
          Operation Income 328 0.0384 0.1051 0.0667 ***
          Gross Profit 327 0.0635 0.1748 0.1113 ***
difference
Table 8
Financial Service Industry Post-Consolidation Changes
This tables presents a summary of explanatory variables scaled by total assets for the 
acquiring U.S. commerical banks that purchase U.S. targets that are either 1) a 
commerical bank, 2) brokerage firm or 3) an insurance company. Panel A reports the 
spillover hypothesis explanatory variables and Panel B reports the values of other control 
variables. This table provides estimates of the mean difference between the acquirers 
characteristics weighted by total assets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively.
 
 
 
Financial Services Industry Product Market Spillover Multivariate Regression 
Results 
The objective is to assess the relationship between financial institution spillover 
and the variation in the firms’ return while accounting for the firm’s efficiency. In other 
words, it is important to control for the possibility that acquiring banks with efficient 
policies and practices may be able to transfer these efficiencies to the target firm. These 
results are reported in Tables 9 and 10. 
After controlling for the firm’s efficiency and acquisition diversity, there is a 
“spillover” in financial institutions. The relationship between the change in excess sales 
and returns is economically significant and meaningful. The results also indicate that 
46 
47 
there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between cash/cash flow and 
returns. These findings suggest that financial institutions that diversify their product 
offerings increase shareholder returns resulting from an increase in excess sales. This 
then leads to an increase in cash and cash flow, which in turn increases firm returns. The 
sample also has a negative and statistically significant coefficient on financial leverage 
spillover (-0.703, t = -2.38), confirming that financially sound institutions experience 
strong valuation effects following acquisition. Thus, banks with stronger capital ratios are 
better positioned to benefit from additional products and services that accompany 
financial services acquisitions. These “spillover” results combined with the strong 
significance of the efficiency measure indicates that, while the complimentary products 
and services supplement the firm’s income, it’s the firms’ efficiency that dictates 
majority of the return. This is evident by the comparison of the univariate efficiency 
regression model and the multivariate regression model. The univariate efficiency 
regression model in Table 7 report an adjusted r-square of .42 compared to the 
multivariate regression model adjusted r-square ranging between .73 and .84. Thus, at 
least half of the explanatory power of the model is due to the efficiency variables. This is 
consistent with Berger and Mester (2003) who find that profit productivity improved 
during the 1991-1997 period. However, the spillover results contradict Berger and Mester 
(2003) finding that cost productivity declines annually. The efficiency and spillover 
findings are consistent with the hypotheses that over the three-year time period, the 
acquiring financial institutions have continued effective and efficient practices while 
benefiting from the spillover of information from the acquired institution. In addition, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms (efficiency*bank/brokerage and 
efficiency*bank/insurance) are both positive and significant. This implies that efficiency 
has a greater effect on returns when the bank merges with either brokerage firms or 
insurance companies than when it merges with another bank. 
Variable model i model ii model iii model iv model v model vi model vii model viii model ix model x model xi model xii
Intercept 0.2381 0.2677 0.2582 0.3018 0.2864 0.2157 0.2524 0.2023 0.1993 0.2004 0.1903 0.2176
(10.71)*** (9.93)*** (11.02)*** (11.23)*** (9.90)*** (10.83)*** (8.98)*** (8.73)*** (7.43)*** (7.28)*** (7.11)*** (9.06)***
Profit Efficiency 0.6437 0.6532 0.6493 0.6671 0.6741 0.6846 0.6578 0.6593 0.6994 0.6997 0.6817 0.6832
(10.38)*** (11.03)*** (10.77)*** (11.21)*** (12.03)*** (12.54)*** (12.31)*** (11.91)*** (13.01)*** (13.14)*** (12.32)*** (12.23)***
Bank/ Brokerage 1.0439 1.1072 1.0814 1.0150 1.1004 1.0348 1.012 1.1259 1.1265 1.0447 0.9706 1.0072
(1.79)** (1.96)* (2.04)** (1.46)* (2.01)** (1.67)** (1.61)* (2.15)** (2.23)** (1.54)* (1.34)* (1.82)**
Bank/ Insurance 0.9830 0.8434 0.7349 0.5358 1.0034 0.9903 0.5406 0.8932 1.0081 0.9814 0.4831 0.8711
(1.32)* (1.56)* (1.47)* (1.29)* (1.66)** (1.36)* (1.31)* (1.29)* (1.92)** (1.50)* (1.26)* (1.68)**
Financial Leverage Spillover -0.7032 -0.7103 -0.6996 -0.7207 -0.6675 -0.6549 -0.6254 -0.6614
(-2.38)*** (-2.58)*** (-2.44)*** (-2.76)*** (-2.08)** (-1.54)* (-1.36)* (-1.77)**
Excess Sales Spillover 0.0339 0.0359 0.0356 0.0311 0.0327 0.0321 0.0379 0.0307
(1.32)* (1.28)* (1.35)* (1.31)* (1.26)* (1.29)* (1.54)* (1.25)*
Cash Flow Spillover 0.0732 0.0769 0.0710 0.0713 0.0726 0.0761
(1.62)* (1.68)** (1.59)* (1.63)* (1.29)* (1.44)*
Cash Spillover 0.0903 0.0979 0.0956 0.0984 0.0918
(1.40)* (1.61)* (1.60)* (1.54)* (1.52)*
Cost of Sales Spillover -0.2907 -0.3150 -0.2725 -0.3452 -0.3278 -0.2882
(-0.64) (-0.69) (-0.70) (-0.62) (-0.68) (-0.73)
Non-Operating Expense Spillover -0.0631 -0.0601 -0.0625 -0.0626 -0.0665
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.10)
Return Risk 0.1627 0.1954 0.1906 0.1759 0.1929 0.1892
(0.74) (0.96) (0.82) (0.78) (0.91) (0.88)
Efficiency* Bank/ Brokerage Interaction 0.6693 0.6779 0.6938 0.7112 0.6833 0.7387 0.7003
(12.19)*** (12.62)*** (12.78)*** (12.91)*** (12.95)*** (14.38)*** (12.71)***
Efficiency* Bank/ Insurance Interaction 0.6452 0.6509 0.6603 0.7089 0.6918
(11.86)*** (12.04)*** (12.17)*** (12.38)*** (12.54)***
Joint Significance between Efficiency 0.6743 0.6983 0.6583 0.6619 0.7002 0.7233 0.6931 0.6931 0.7119 0.7812 0.7976 0.7079
and Interaction (12.39)*** (12.87)*** (12.15)*** (12.38)*** (12.66)*** (13.09)*** (13.12)*** (12.43)*** (12.77)*** (14.57)*** (12.88)*** (12.84)***
Year Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign.
Number of Observations Used 320 305 310 302 305 320 305 305 321 317 305 314
F Test 43.42 42.81 54.92 55.11 27.83 34.82 37.32 34.19 37.62 33.67 37.98 32.09
P-Value 0.0002 0.0009 0.0005 0.0002 0.0021 0.0030 0.0037 0.0033 0.0041 0.0035 0.0049 0.0032
Adjusted R2 0.8006 0.7920 0.8329 0.8408 0.7396 0.7623 0.7831 0.7751 0.7896 0.7815 0.7910 0.7665
financial service industry mergers.The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 9
This table presents the results of the multivariate regression model used to explain the cross-sectional variation in the post-FSMA three-year returns of Financial Service Industry acquirers. This table 
presents the results of the regression model, using the 353 Financial Service Industry acquisitions from November 1999 to December 2002 where the acquirer is a U.S. commerical bank and the target is 
either 1) a commerical bank, 2) brokerage firm or 3) an insurance company. The dependent varialbe is the post-FSMA three-year return for the consolidated financial firm. The key indepedent variable is 
Profit efficiency. The profit efficiency measure was created using a distribution free random error method. To implement the distribution-free random error method, I estimate the profit function using data 
of 2214 financial institutions with continuous   Using the results of these estimations, I calculate the profit efficiency for every financial institution with the distribution-free method, which distinguishes 
efficiency differences from random error by averaging the profit function residuals over time. Bank/Brokerage is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one for commerical bank and brokerage firm 
mergers and zero otherwise. Bank/Insurance is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one for commerical bank and insurance 
company mergers and zero otherwise.  Other post-consolidation acquirer independent variables are: logarithm of assets for the acquirers' assets; financial leverage is the book debt to total assets; the 
operation expense is the cost of goods sold for operations; excess sales is actual sales change less predicted sales changeis. Efficiency,  measured as the bank’s efficiency utilizing the distribution-free profit 
or operational efficiency variable to predict sales changes; cash is measured as the total book value of cash of the consoldated firm; the cash flow is measured as the change is cash availability of the acquirer 
the year prior to the acquisition; the Cost of Sales (COS) is the cost of goods sold plus any expenses incurred in the selling and delivery of the product or service including the purchase of raw material and 
manufactured finished products; the non-operating income expense is the expense incurred in performance of activities not directly related to the main business of the firm, such as the maintenance of 
buildings and equipment; return risk is the standard deviation of returns for 36 months multiplied by the square root of 36 resulting in the three-year risk in returns; and year is a dichotomous variable represen
Multivariate Analysis of Financial Service Inudstry M&As with the Profit Efficiency Measure
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Utilizing the operational efficiency measure to account for the acquirers’ post-
consolidation efficiency, the Table 10 results on spillover confirm the earlier results. 
There is spillover from the target firm to the acquiring bank. There is a significant 
positive association between the change in excess sales and the firms’ returns while 
controlling for firm risk and accounting for operation efficiency. The “Excess Sales” 
spillover and the “Cash/ Cash Flow” spillover are slightly larger than previously reported 
when efficiency is measured using operational efficiency. This is probably due to the 
inclusiveness of the profit efficiency measure and the limitations of the operation 
efficiency measure. The efficiency measures (profit and operation efficiencies) are 
statistically significant (Tables 9 and 10). These findings suggest that the acquiring firms’ 
efficiency help explains the three-year returns. This is consistent with the results of 
Rhoades (1998) that finds modest cost efficiency gains using data from the early 1990s.14 
However, the increase in statistical significance for the spillover variables in Table 10 
suggests that product market spillover explains the future returns of acquiring banks. 
                                                 
14 Note that Berger (1998) reports conflicting results finding very little improvement in cost efficiency for 
M&As of either large or small banks using data from 1991 to 1997. 
49 
Variable model i model ii model iii model iv model v model vi model vii model viii model ix model x model xi model xii
Intercept 0.5022 0.4192 0.4931 0.4203 0.4216 0.41289 0.519238 0.5231 0.4308 0.47928 0.3999 0.4002
(11.43)*** (11.38)*** (11.65)*** (11.10)*** (11.83)*** (11.21)*** (10.32)*** (10.94)*** (9.92)*** (10.32)*** (11.01)*** (10.44)***
Operational Efficiency 0.2273 0.2995 0.2442 0.2555 0.2002 0.2235 0.2285 0.2469 0.2224 0.2384 0.2445 0.2827
(1.61)* (1.66)** (1.72)** (1.58)** (1.69)** (1.36)* (1.44)* (1.59)* (1.41)* (1.37)* (1.67)** (1.75)**
Bank/ Brokerage 1.2654 1.3110 1.2148 1.2098 1.2305 1.2675 1.3510 1.3037 1.1986 1.2047 1.3002 1.3094
(2.08)** (2.37)** (1.82)** (1.74)** (1.89)** (2.05)** (2.21)** (2.39)** (1.54)* (1.59)* (2.48)** (2.51)**
Bank/ Insurance 1.0025 1.0011 1.0025 1.0042 1.0045 1.0033 1.0023 1.0035 1.0023 1.0024 1.0035 1.0028
(1.79)** (1.65)** (1.43)* (1.85)** (1.81)** (1.98)** (2.03)** (1.93)** (1.41)* (1.43)* (1.95)** (1.83)**
Financial Leverage Spillover -1.4399 -1.4538 -1.2843 -1.2930 -1.6287 -1.5843 -1.6390 -1.6303
(-2.20)*** (-2.24)** (2.13)** (2.14)** (-2.51)*** (-2.47)** (-2.30)*** (2.53)***
6
Excess Sales Spillover 0.0624 0.0629 0.0707 0.0630 0.0692 0.0720 0.0673 0.0693
(1.53)** (1.56)* (1.76)** (1.51)* (1.63)* (1.88)** (1.57)* (1.65)**
Cash Flow Spillover 0.0921 0.1029 0.0903 0.1010 0.0913 0.0912
(1.99)** (2.25)** (1.97)** (2.19)* (2.01)** (1.89)**
Cash Spillover 0.1030 0.1035 0.1050 0.1021 0.1007
(1.68)** (1.74)** (1.85)** (1.58)* (1.38)*
Cost of Sales Spillover -0.6294 -0.6527 -0.6385 -0.6103 -0.7024 -0.6584
(-1.02) (-1.01) (-0.82) (-0.69) (-0.71) (-0.51)
Non-Operating Expense Spillover -0.0112 0.0111 0.0142 -0.0193 -0.0164
(-0.63) (-0.89) (-0.59) (-0.48) (-0.32)
Return Risk 0.40743 0.5109238 0.5402931 0.4692837 0.502981 0.4198241
(0.97) (1.10) (1.21) (1.03) (1.14) (1.15)
Efficiency* Bank/ Brokerage Interaction 1.4924 1.5299 1.4205 1.5104 1.5584 1.3392 1.4982
(2.78)*** (2.88)*** (2.36)*** (2.80)** (3.11)*** (1.68)** (2.79)***
Efficiency* Bank/ Insurance Interaction 1.2837 1.3003948 1.302293 1.2908 1.3211
(1.67)** (2.00)** (2.10)** (1.89)* (1.91)**
Joint Significance between Efficiency 1.7829 1.8440 1.5298 1.5890 1.7298 1.8298 1.9828 1.5901 1.5511 1.5982 1.7932 1.6035
and Interaction (3.02)*** (3.24)*** (1.88)** (2.89)*** (2.99)*** (3.15)*** (3.34)*** (2.90)*** (2.76)*** (1.88)** (3.13)*** (2.80)***
Year Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign. Insign.
Number of Observations Used 320 305 310 302 305 320 305 305 321 317 305 314
F Test 24.18 26.06 27.54 22.71 19.69 17.39 23.37 13.77 21.32 12.19 23.91 13.20
P- Value 0.0006 0.0011 0.0009 0.0002 0.0015 0.0023 0.0015 0.0030 0.0008 0.0038 0.0016 0.0029
This table presents the results of the multivariate regression model used to explain the cross-sectional variation in the post-FSMA three-year returns of Financial Service Industry acquirers. This table 
presents the results of the regression model, using the 353 Financial Service Industry acquisitions from November 1999 to December 2002 where the acquirer is a U.S. commerical bank and the target is 
either 1) a commerical bank, 2) brokerage firm or 3) an insurance company. The dependent varialbe is the post-FSMA three-year return for the consolidated financial firm. The key indepedent variable is 
Operation efficiency. Operation efficiency is defined as the ratio of operation expenses of financial institution to that of the assets of financial institution.  
Ban
Adjusted R2 .0.5039 0.5107 0.5203 0.4993 0.4822 0.4638 0.5002 0.4387 0.4975 0.3928 0.5026 0.4173
k/Brokerage is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one for commerical bank and brokerage firm mergers and zero otherwise. Bank/Insurance is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 
of one for commerical bank and insurance company mergers and zero otherwise.  Other post-consolidation acquirer independent variables are: logarithm of assets for the acquirers' assets; financial 
leverage is the book debt to total assets; the operation expense is the cost of goods sold for operations; excess sales is actual sales change less predicted sales changeis. Efficiency,  measured as the bank’s 
efficiency utilizing the distribution-free profit or operational efficiency variable to predict sales changes; cash is measured as the total book value of cash of the consoldated firm; the cash flow is 
measured as the change is cash availability of the acquirer the year prior to the acquisition; the Cost of Sales (COS) is the cost of goods sold plus any expenses incurred in the selling and delivery of the 
product or service including the purchase of raw material and manufactured finished products; the non-operating income expense is the 
expense incurred in performance of activities not directly related to the main business of the firm, such as the maintenance of buildings and equipment; return risk is the standard deviation of returns for 
36 months multiplied by the square root of 36 resulting in the three-year risk in returns; and year is a dichotomous variable representing.the year of the acquisition.  Interaction variables are also included 
to examine the relationship of efficiency to the various types of financial service industry mergers.The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.
Table 10
Multivariate Analysis of Financial Service Inudstry M&As with the Operation Efficiency Measure
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Conclusion 
In this paper, I examine the long-term effects of the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999 which allowed the combination of banking, brokerage and 
insurance services under one financial conglomerate. This paper examines the different 
types of financial combinations and the size of the transaction value for the varying types 
of mergers. This study attempts to explain the cross sectional acquisition premium for the 
varying types of financial service mergers. I employ a multivariate regression analysis to 
study the merger transaction value and explain the long-term returns of the financial 
combinations. 
As in the extant manufacturing literature, the banking industry mergers and 
acquisitions transaction value is related to the size of the target. The results also indicate 
that the acquiring firm’s financial characteristics including the firm’s size, leverage and 
operating cost determine the acquisition premium. This suggests that not only does the 
target value dictate the amount paid for the assets but also the target firms’ ability to be 
integrated and compliment acquiring firm financial standing. In addition, the large 
transaction values within the financial industry mergers/ acquisitions has lead to 
significant premiums paid for the targets.  
The premiums paid for the firms within the financial service industry vary from 
acquisition type to acquisition type. The results show that on average the premium paid is 
approximately 17% above target value. The merger premiums for commercial bank/ 
commercial bank and commercial bank/ brokerage firm mergers are statistically larger 
than those for commercial bank/ insurance company mergers. This may be due to the 
ease with which the acquiring commercial bank can cross sell its products and services 
with other banks and brokerage firms. The difference in premiums can also be the 
function of the difference in the size of assets and clientele between commercial bank, 
brokerage firms and insurance companies. Since insurance companies are significantly 
larger than other types of financial service companies there may be greater spillover 
benefit in cross selling products and services. 
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This paper also examines the announcement day market response for acquisitions 
within the financial service industry to specifically determine whether diversifying 
acquisitions add value for shareholders. This study shows that on the date of acquisition 
announcement the entire sample experiences no statistically significant response. 
However, both diversifying mergers between commercial banks and brokerage firms and 
commercial banks with insurance companies report a statistically significant increase in 
returns. Examining the pre- and post- announcement daily returns indicates that for the 
commercial bank mergers with brokerage firm sample, there is a significant increase in 
abnormal returns on the day of and day after the acquisition announcement of 10.2% and 
1.9% respectively. In addition, commercial bank mergers with insurance companies have 
a positive abnormal market response of 5.9% when compare to the market return. All of 
the results are consistent with the theory that diversifying financial services industry 
acquisitions increase shareholder value. 
The large premiums reflect expectations that the acquiring firms will be able to 
cross-sell their products and utilize information from different divisions to develop 
superior services or for the acquirer to put in place efficient policies and practices to 
receive superior returns. Utilizing the distribution-free random error method, I find 
evidence that acquiring financial firms are more efficient than target firms and that these 
efficiencies dictate long-term performance of the firms. I find that not only profit 
efficiency but also operation efficiency determines future returns. There is also evidence 
that when banks engage in diversifying mergers with brokerage firms the effects of profit 
efficiency on post-consolidation returns are larger than those of commercial bank/ 
commercial bank mergers. 
A competing view holds that financial acquirers are able to cross-market products 
and services resulting from spillover between divisions. Looking at a variety of spillover 
characteristics, the results indicate that acquiring financial firms take advantage of the 
diversity. The results indicate that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the three-year change excess sales and returns. This suggests that 
financial institutions that diversify their products and services are able to increase 
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shareholder wealth by selling more products. Spillover can also be seen by the change in 
cash flow for the post-consolidated financial conglomerate. On average, if the financial 
conglomerate can increase cash flow that will lead to an increase in shareholder returns.  
The ratification of the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act authorized 
commercial banks, brokerage firms and insurance companies to combine their businesses 
and thus significantly broadened their product and service offerings and improve their 
ability to compete with industry rivals. Estimation of the multivariate regression models 
show some evidence of support for both the efficiency and spillover hypotheses. Thus, 
the proprietary customer information gathered by one financial intermediary is efficiently 
and effectively disseminated to complimentary divisions of the financial conglomerate. 
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 Essay 2 
“Down but Not Out” Mutual Fund Manager Turnover within Fund Families 
Introduction 
Ever since Berle and Means (1932) first established that there is a separation 
between ownership and control and Jensen and Meckling (1976) recognized that this 
disconnect between managers and shareholders causes agency issues, financial 
economists have discussed ways to eliminate or at least minimize these agency concerns. 
The financial literature has advanced two fundamental theories about how to address 
agency problems and influence manager behavior. First, financial economists suggest that 
the board of directors design compensation schemes to provide managers with effective 
incentives to maximize shareholder value (pay-performance). Secondly, the market for 
corporate control imposes some constraints on the managers’ actions. These two 
approaches are designed to align the managers’ behavior with shareholders wealth 
maximization. Despite the interest in this area, there has yet to be a study that examines 
the effects of both the pay-performance and the market for corporate control theories 
simultaneously. The uniqueness of the mutual fund industry and the mutual fund manager 
contracts allows us to reexamine these agency issues.  
Within the mutual fund industry, this issue is significant given the importance of 
management in the implementation of the fund’s investment strategy, the sizable assets 
under their control, and the potential impact it has on the overall success and profitability 
of the fund complex. The issue is also critical in terms of the different corporate 
governance mechanisms and principal-agent problems that exist between investors, 
shareholders, and management. This is because investors that entrust funds to managers 
cannot participate in exercising corporate control in the same manner in which 
shareholders can exercise their collective will on company boards. Accordingly, while 
internal control mechanisms of investment management organizations are likely to be 
related to corporate governance practices experienced by industrial organizations, the 
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literature has not devoted significant attention to organizational structure that is 
associated with changes in mutual fund management of investment firms. 
Thus far, the mutual fund literature has investigated how mutual fund manager 
turnover is affected by past performance and manager age. Examining the relation 
between mutual fund managerial replacement and prior performance, Khorana (1996) 
finds evidence of an inverse relation between the probability of fund manager 
replacement and past performance. Extending the work of Khorana (1996), Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999) investigate the link between mutual fund managers’ age and the 
probability of manager replacement. They find that younger managers are more likely to 
be replaced if the fund’s systematic and unsystematic risks deviate from the investment 
objective’s average risk level. Khorana (1996) also documents that the magnitude of 
underperformance that investment advisors are willing to accept before replacing a 
manager is positively related to the volatility of the underlying assets being managed by 
fund managers. Khorana states that his findings are “consistent with well-functioning 
internal and external market mechanisms for mutual fund managers.”15 However, is it 
possible that previous research, by ignoring the specific organizational form and, more 
specifically, the management structure of the fund family, might have significantly 
overstated the sensitivity of managerial replacement to past performance?  
My first objective in this paper is to extend the Khorana (1996) and Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999) results to a setting that accounts for both the fund family organizational 
structure and the individual characteristics of fund managers. While previous literature 
helps us understand the replacement-performance relationship of mutual fund managers, 
we know little about how the managerial structure of the mutual fund family influences 
the sponsor’s willingness to replace underperforming managers.   
                                                 
15 One weakest of the mutual fund managerial turnover literature is that it is difficult to 
distinguish between turnover due to promotion and turnover due to demotion caused by 
underperformance. In a working paper, Hu, Hall and Harvey (2000) separates manager 
changes into promotions and demotions. Their evidence suggests that the probability that 
a manager is likely to be fired or demoted is negatively correlated with the fund's current 
and past performance and the promotion probability is positively related with the fund's 
current and past performance. 
55 
In addition, this study identifies the importance of the management structure 
within the mutual fund industry. Within some fund families, a portfolio manager works 
autonomously managing only one fund. At other fund families, an individual portfolio 
manager is responsible for two or more mutual funds within the same sector, related 
sectors or with complementary investment objectives. For the sample period, 22% of 
mutual funds accounting for 25% of the funds under management are now in the multiple 
fund management structure. Fund sponsors make manager turnover decisions by 
comparing the cost of firing UFM versus MFM16 and the benefits of having the MFM 
structure. The incremental cost of replacing a unitary fund manager includes the 
employee search cost and hiring of a new fund manager and the potential cost of losing 
loyal investment customers of the replaced manager. Under the MFM structure, these 
costs aren’t necessarily a concern for fund sponsors since the replaced managers remain 
with the fund family. In addition, the MFM structure lowers the individual cost of 
operating each fund. If fund sponsors are less likely to end the services of a UFM 
manager, because it is more costly to the sponsor, then this is a clear indication of a 
conflict of interests because for the same level of underperformance investors would 
benefit more if the “pay for performance” relationship (proposed by Khorana (1996)) 
worked effectively for the costlier funds/fund management system. However, without 
considering the specific organizational form and, more specifically, the management 
structure of the fund family previous research might have significantly overstated the 
sensitivity of managerial replacement to past performance. I show that, in addition to 
prior performance and managerial experience, the number of individual funds managed 
by a fund manager increases the probability of manager replacement. UFM are -2.77% 
less likely to be replaced than a MFM, even though both managers are underperforming. 
This suggests that fund sponsors tend to replace underperformers only when it is “cheap” 
because replacing a UFM is more expensive than taking one fund from a manager that 
                                                 
16 In the case of an MFM, we regard a manager as having been replaced if he is relieved of his duties 
related to one or more funds of the two or more that he manages, even if he continues to be in charge of 
other funds. 
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operates multiple funds. This presents an obvious conflict of interests between fund 
investors and fund management. 
The second objective of this study, as in Khorana (2001), is to examine whether 
funds that experienced manager replacement underperform funds where the manager 
maintains responsibility and, if so, by how much and for how long prior to replacement. 
However, unlike Khorana (2001) this study takes into account the fund family 
management structure prior to replacement. Consistent with Khorana (2001), I find that 
new fund managers exhibit dramatic performance improvement in the post-replacement 
period. This finding suggests that the previous manages were replaced due to poor past 
performance. Potential explanations for poor past performance is that fund managers 
have too many funds or fund objectives to manage to be effective and/ or diminished 
fund management abilities. I also find that unitary fund managers significantly 
underperform their objective and risk adjusted peers (1.8%, 2.8% respectively), which is 
a greater underperformance than multiple fund managers (1.2%, 2.6% respectively). It 
appears that fund sponsors are more tolerant of unitary fund managers’ underperformance 
than that of multiple fund managers. Contrary to Khorana (1996, 2001), these findings 
suggest weaker internal control mechanism than previously thought. 
The final objective is to extend the work Chevalier and Ellison (1999a,b) and 
Gallagher (2003), who examine performance related to investment manager 
characteristics, including experience, institutional asset size, and investment management 
characteristics. As in Chevalier and Ellison (1999a,b) and Gallagher (2003) this study 
documents an inverse relationship between manager tenure and the probability of 
replacement. After simultaneously accounting for manager tenure and past performance, I 
find a statistically significant negative relationship with the probability of a manager 
being replaced and the combination of manager tenure and past performance. This 
finding suggests that sponsors are reluctant to fire poor performers if they are 
experienced fund managers. This may be because even with underperformance, relative 
to peers, fund managers have an established relationship with investors and firing the 
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manager can signal problems to potential investors and result in an outflow of funds from 
current investors.  This would lead to a reduction in sponsor income. 
This study represents the first significant and rigorous examination of the 
relationship between performance, manager characteristics and fund family management 
structure.  In this paper, I present evidence that mutual fund replacement is not only 
contingent on previous performance and manager tenure but also on the number of 
individual funds managed by the fund manager. In addition, I document the importance 
of the management structure within the mutual fund industry. While previous literature 
helps us understand the replacement-performance relationship of mutual fund managers, 
we know little about how the organizational form, specifically the managerial structure, 
of the mutual fund family influences the sensitivity of replacement to past performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the 
related literature and develops the hypotheses tested. Section III describes the data and 
methodology used for analysis. Section IV provides a sample description and preliminary 
statistics of the replaced fund managers. Section IV also presents the empirical results of 
the study. I conclude this paper with a summary of my findings in Section V.   
 
Related Literature/ Hypotheses Development 
 Agency Issues 
Financial economists have found that agency problems or conflict of interests 
between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) come from two sources. First, 
managers and shareholders have different goals and preferences. Secondly, managers and 
shareholders have imperfect information as to each others’ knowledge, actions and 
preferences. Berle and Means (1932) notes that this separation provides managers with 
the ability to act in their own self-interest rather than in the interest of shareholders 
without corporate governance mechanisms. Shleifer and Vishney (1997) also finds that 
managers use their discretion to benefit themselves personally in a variety of ways such 
as empire building (Jensen, 1972), failure to distribute excess cash when the firm does 
not have profitable investment opportunities (Jensen, 1986), and manager entrenchment 
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(Murphy, Shleifer and Vishney, 1989). Within the mutual fund industry, the interaction 
between investors and fund management represents a principal–agent relationship. 
Investors delegate assets to professional fund managers with the expectation that 
performance will be commensurate with the fund’s investment objective. However, while 
performance is important to the fund family, the primary goal for a fund complex is to 
maximize the total assets under management, as revenue is generated as a percentage of 
fund assets under management. Although performance and fund size are interrelated 
(Gruber (1996)), the first objective for a fund manager is to maximize total assets under 
management. 
There are two distinct theories about how to effectively deal with these agency 
problems. In general terms, these theories can be viewed as internal and external control 
mechanisms (Fama, 1980). The design of the compensation contracts by the board of 
directors is considered an internal control mechanism while the market for corporate 
control is an external control mechanism.  There has been extensive research conducted 
on compensation contracts and agency issues.17 Several papers find that compensation 
contracts seem to reflect managerial rent-seeking rather than the proper incentives to 
align manager actions with shareholder interest (Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer, 1994; Yermack, 1995; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk, Fried and 
Walker, 2003). However, Jensen and Murphy (1990) asserts that optimal contracting 
arrangements require large amounts of compensation for executives to provide managers 
with powerful incentives to enhance shareholder value. This suggests the use of equity- 
based compensation contracts to make pay more sensitive to performance. The mutual 
fund industry utilizes the suggested equity-based compensation contracts by aligning the 
management fee (a stated rate) with the value of the fund’s net assets. Thus, the 
managers’ compensation increases only as the fund’s net assets grow. 
The second control mechanism, the market for corporate control, is such an 
important issue that the Journal of Financial Economics published a special issue on the 
topic in 1983. Jensen and Ruback (1984) is a survey paper of these papers. They view the 
                                                 
17 See Murphy (1999) and Core, Guay and Lacker (2003) for surveys on optimal contracting models and 
agency issues. 
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market for corporate control as a market in which alternative managerial teams compete 
for the rights to manage corporate resources. Thus, in theory, the market for corporate 
control influences both the managerial labor market and managerial behavior. However, 
Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) find that a hostile bidder must be prepared to 
pay a substantial premium in order to acquire a target firm, providing the target 
management with a “golden parachute” and weakening the disciplinary force of the 
market for corporate control.18 Fund family manager turnover allows us to examine both 
the replacement-performance and market for corporate control mechanisms 
simultaneously.   
 
 
 
Past Performance 
Within the mutual fund industry, where pay and performance are directly linked, 
the managerial labor market has played a major role in enhancing shareholder wealth. 
Khorana (1996) examines the relation between the replacement of mutual fund managers 
and their prior performance. He finds an inverse relation between the probability of 
managerial replacement and fund performance, using the growth rate in the fund’s assets 
and portfolio returns. Similarly, Ding and Wermers (2005) document a positive cross-
sectional relation between performance and replacement. Khorana (2001) goes on to 
examine the impact of mutual fund manager replacement on subsequent fund 
performance. He documents significant improvements in post-replacement performance 
relative to the past performance of the fund, suggesting that the market for corporate 
control benefits shareholder wealth. Hence, I hypothesize that past performance will have 
an inverse relation with fund family manager turnover. However, after accounting for 
fund manager characteristics and fund family responsibilities past performance will have 
a decreased effect than previously reported in Khorana (2001). 
 
                                                 
18 Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) find that during the second half of the 1990s, the average 
premium in hostile acquisitions was 40 percent.  
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  Management Structure 
Mutual fund sponsors and mutual fund investors have different goals and 
preference for their fund managers. The fund sponsors require managers earn high 
management fees while maintaining low costs for the fund(s) they manage. To achieve 
these desired goals, fund sponsor increase total profits by maintaining the level of fund 
performance or inflows and decreasing the individual cost of operating each fund. In 
addition, fund sponsors can optimize management fees for a given level of fund 
performance. On the other hand, mutual fund investors prefer managers to obtain superior 
fund returns and charge minimum fund expenses.  Investors rather fund managers 
maximize fund returns by focusing on a single fund’s performance and efficiently 
pursuing these maximized fund’s returns.  The difference in goals and preferences results 
in conflict of interests between sponsors and investors and can manifest in the fund 
management structure.  
At some fund families, a portfolio manager works autonomously managing only 
one fund. At other fund families, an individual portfolio manager is responsible for two 
or more mutual funds within the same sector, related sectors or with complementary 
investment objectives. For example, in 2001 Fidelity Funds manager John Carlson 
managed the Fidelity Emerging Market fund, Fidelity Strategic Income fund and Fidelity 
International Bond fund simultaneously. Similarly, Charles Melhouse managed the Fortis 
Capital fund, Fortis Fiduciary fund and Fortis Growth and Income fund in 2002 for Fortis 
Funds Inc. However, both Fidelity Inc. and Fortis Funds Inc. implement the UFM 
structure as well. In 2002, Stephen Poling singularly managed Fortis Growth Fund and 
Jason Weiner solely managed Fidelity Contrafund. I contend that manager turnover 
policy is affected by the management structure. That is, fund sponsors are less likely to 
end the services of a manager that manages a single fund, because it is more costly to the 
sponsor, then this is a clear indication of a conflict of interests because for the same level 
of underperformance investors would benefit more if the “pay for performance” 
relationship (proposed by Khorana (1996)) worked effectively for the costlier funds/fund 
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management system. Fund sponsors are less likely to fire a UFM than a MFM with 
similar underperform because the cost of searching and employing a unitary fund 
manager and the threat of the investors withdrawing funds is greater. The increased 
replacement costs with a decrease in fund management fee result in lower fund sponsors 
profits. Thus, sponsors may be slower to replace UFM than MFM giving rise to a conflict 
of interests between investors that expect the superior fund performance and management 
decisions regardless of the management structure. 
Shleifer and Vishney (1989) argue that managers engage in diversification 
acquisitions to make themselves indispensable to the firm. They note that when the 
acquired assets or subsidiary ceases to provide further entrenchment benefits, the 
manager initiates divestures. Empirical evidence has shown that divested divisions do 
better as stand-alone entities than as part of a larger conglomerate (Myerson (1982), 
Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) and Hubbard and Pahlia (1999)). However, John and 
Ofek (1995) find that the typical divested division is performing as well as the industry at 
the time of the divesture, suggesting that the divested managers are benefiting from the 
good fortune of the industry and not their management ability. Similarly, Massa (2003) 
shows that the degree of product differentiation negatively affects fund performance and 
positively affects fund proliferation. Further, Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) find that 
families that are more concentrated perform better. After accounting for the management 
structure given a certain level of underperformance, I hypothesize that unitary fund 
managers (multiple fund managers) are less (more) likely to experience manager 
turnover. 
 
Expense Ratio and Management Fee 
The expense ratio is an important metric when comparing funds, because money 
paid for expenses is money that is not invested and earns no profit. Khorana (2001) 
suggests that in a competitive market, expense ratios should decline over time where 
investors become more price-sensitive, investment management firms increase in size 
and improve their economies of scale, and new entrants commence operations. Santini 
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and Aber (1998), shows exactly the opposite is true: As fund size increases, fund 
expenses tend to rise rather than fall  They find that fund complexes less likely to 
compete on expenses because people don't seem to care. In addition, high expense ratios 
are not proportional to better management. Wermers (2000) finds that high-expense funds 
underperform index funds, which are minimally managed and have very low expense 
ratios. However, fund managers still earn a management fee regardless of the funds 
overall performance. Management fee is the largest component of expense ratio. The 
management fee is the portion of the expense ratio that the fund manager receives for his/ 
her advising and stock selections. As stated earlier, the fund sponsor’s primary goal is for 
fund managers to earn high management fees while maintaining low costs for the fund(s) 
they manage. Thus, suppose a fund sponsor is faced with two similarly underperforming 
funds, but which provide different levels of management fees per dollar of managed 
assets.  Given that the sponsor is compensated on the basis of assets under management 
and not on performance, it seems unlikely that the sponsor would more quickly replace 
the high-fee fund.  This is especially the case given that manager replacement may lead to 
redemption.  This would be a clear conflict of interests because it is in investors’ interest 
if more expeditious action is taken against the underperforming high-fee fund.  Hence, I 
hypothesize that the probability of replacement is lower with high expense/ management 
fee funds for any given level of performance.  I also hypothesize that the probability of 
replacement is lower for high expense, UFM funds for any given level of 
underperformance. This is because replacing a high-fee fund manager could lead to 
greater redemptions and a loss of fee income while having to incur greater costs of 
replacing a manager who manages a single fund.  
 
 
Fund Size 
The sensitivity of investor inflows to fund performance is well documented 
(Ippolito, 1992; Sirri and Tufano, 1992; and Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). Similarly, 
Gruber (1996) finds evidence that “sophisticated” investors are able to recognize superior 
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management, witnessed by the fact that the flow of new money into and out of mutual 
funds follows the predictors of future performance. Fund families recognize the 
importance and the benefits of having popular, well-performing funds. Analyzing the 
determinants of mutual fund starts, Khorana and Servaes (1999) identify several factors 
that induce fund families to set up new funds, such as economies of scale and scope, the 
overall level of funds invested, and the family’s prior performance. Fund families market 
not only the superior performance of their managers but also their funds in general to 
increase investor inflows and thus increase total net assets managed and management 
fees. Elton, Gruber and Busse (2004) find that investors buy funds with higher marketing 
costs than the best-performing funds. Fund families also market the performance of their 
“star” funds to increase fund family inflows. Massa (1998) shows a positive spillover to 
other family funds from having a star fund. Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) also finds a 
positive spillover effect on the inflows of other family funds resulting from having a star 
performing fund without the negative effect from a poor performing fund. Guedj and 
Papastaikoudi (2004) reports that this “star” performance is more prevalent for large fund 
families than their smaller peers. Thus, larger fund families receive benefits from having 
“star” managers and funds due to the spillover into other family funds. Since managers 
are evaluated on past-performance and assets under management, it stands to reason that 
the fund size, in total net assets, and fund’s age will have an inverse relation with the 
probability of manager turnover.19  
 
 
Manager Tenure and Reputation 
When an investor buys a managed equity mutual fund, she is buying a manager’s 
expertise in picking stocks. When investors evaluate funds most investors track the 
historical (typically the previous 3, 5 or 10 year) performance of the fund rather than the 
performance of the manager in place at the time of superior performance. It is important 
                                                 
19 Note that improved performance and increase in age, while related are not synonymous. For instance, if 
the fund attracts new investors after a bout of heavy advertising, it could experience an increase in its size 
while experiencing lower returns (net) if the advertisement is paid for form (increased) 12b-1 fees. 
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for investors to look for an investment manager who has not only supervised the fund for 
substantial length of time, but also who has been in charge of the fund when it produced 
its best results. The longevity of a manager shows that the manager can produce in both 
the bull and bear markets and that the manager is not the recipient of “luck-based” 
returns- returns associated with profit increases that are entirely generated by external 
factors (such as changes in oil prices) rather than by the manager’s expertise. A manager 
who follows a consistent trading strategy and who delivers consistent returns over a 
relatively long period of time benefits investors by decreasing the volatility of investors’ 
returns (Busse 1999).  Thus the manager’s tenure leads to a reputation effect that the fund 
family can benefit from. Diamond (1989) states that reputation is important when there is 
a diverse pool of observationally equivalent firms. Rosson and Brooks (2004) states that 
reputation can be seen as the collective judgment of outsiders about an organization’s 
actions and achievements. Fombrun (1996) posits that when positive, this reputational 
capital is viewed as an asset that becomes a competitive advantage to the company. 
Hence, I hypothesize that the manager’s experience and tenure is inversely related to the 
likelihood of manager replacement within the fund family. Additionally, I hypothesize 
that for any level of recent poor performance, longer tenure reduces the probability of 
replacement.  
 
 
 Style Drift/ Tracking Error 
A portfolio manager’s selection of securities should be consistent with the mutual 
fund’s investment objective, which is stated in the fund’s prospectus. A mutual fund’s 
(stated) investment objective is established when the fund is created and can be changed 
only with a majority vote of the fund’s shareholders. However, Busse (2001) reports that 
managers increase risk levels or “style drift” to increase return performance following a 
period of poor performance. Thus, an increase in style drift provides some indication of 
manager incompetence. However, Brown and Harlow (2006) find that funds with greater 
style drift performs better than their peers during recessions or in down markets. Hence, I 
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hypothesize that the probability of a manager being replaced increases with the 
manager’s increase in style drift.   
 
Fund Styles/ Competency 
To select the most suitable mutual fund an investor must be able to differentiate 
clearly amongst the numerous investment objectives that fund families offer and 
understand the basic strategies by which the fund manager seeks to achieve the stated 
objective. Each investment objective requires the fund manager have specific knowledge, 
expertise and level of competency. This may require a manager, who manages multiple 
funds, to have experience in a variety of fund styles. There are several investment 
objectives, each targeted to an investor with a specific risk tolerance and time horizon. 
For example, the growth objective can be divided into aggressive growth, established 
growth, growth and income, large-cap growth, micro-cap growth, mid-cap growth, and 
small-cap/small company growth funds. Funds with assets of different characteristics 
require different management skills (Deli (2002)). For instance, stock funds require 
greater competence than bond funds. Due to the variety of fund styles, I hypothesize that 
the number of objectives managed is inversely related to the likelihood of a manager 
being replaced. That is managers who are offered multiple objectives to manage have 
greater skill and become entrenched making them less likely to be fired.  
 
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Sample Selection Procedure 
I examine the returns and characteristics of replaced fund managers over the 1997 
to 2001 period. This database is constructed from two sources. First, I obtain the 
information on the month and year in which the current manager commenced overseeing 
the operations of the fund and thus the month and year in which the previous manager 
was replaced from the Morningstar Principia database. I am also able to track the number 
of funds and objectives each fund manager operates by the manager characteristics 
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provided in the Morningstar database. In addition, I receive the annual fund style, 
turnover ratio, expense ratio, fund size (in total net assets-TNA), capital gains overhang, 
fund age (in years), 12b-1 fees, fund family affiliation and fund returns20 from the 
Morningstar database. Second, using fund names, fund family affiliation and other fund 
information, I supplement the Morningstar database with the Center for Research and 
Securities Prices (CRSP) database which provides monthly returns and investment 
objectives. I utilize this information to calculate the twelve month tracking error and style 
drift variables (Ammann and Zimmermann (2001) and Brown and Harlow (2006).  
To compute the tracking error, I follow Ammann and Zimmermann (2001), and 
use the square root of the non-central second moment of deviation according to the 
following equation, 
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where Ri,t denotes the return of the tracking fund in time t, Rbench,t the return of the pre-
determined benchmark portfolio in period t, and n is the sample size.  
To calculate the tracking error and style drift variables, I first classify each fund 
according to the Morningstar investment style grid. I then selected a benchmark for each 
fund based on the above classification. Following Brown and Harlow (2006), I selected 
the Russell group of style benchmarks, which are available on line from the Frank 
Russell Company. I regress each fund’s returns over the last 12 months before the 
replacement of the fund manager on the benchmark returns and take 1-R2 as the measure 
of style drift.21   
                                                 
20 Morningstar and the Center for Research and Securities Prices (CRSP) list fund returns net of expenses 
and taxes. 
21 There are several broadly similar approaches to estimating style drift.  Brown and Harlow (2006) use the 
standard deviation of differences in returns relative to a benchmark that reflects the investment style of the 
fund and 1-R2 from a regression of the fund returns on the benchmark.  Chan et al. (2002) take the absolute 
difference in the factor loadings from a regression of a fund’s returns on the Fama-French factors over 
consecutive sub-periods.  Amman and Zimmerman (2001) take the standard deviation of the residuals from 
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Consistent with Gruber (1996), I define fund net flow as the growth in the fund 
assets net of growth in existing assets22: 
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where TNAi,t denotes fund i’s total net assets at the end of month t and Ri,t is return of 
fund i over month t. 
To get the final manager replacement sample, I first exclude funds without 
manager tenure, turnover ratio, expense ratio, fund total net asset, capital gains overhang, 
fund age, 12b-1 fees, fund family affiliation and fund returns data. Second, for 
calculations, I include the weighted average of all classes of fund shares in the final 
sample. Third, I exclude funds that list multiple fund managers for an individual fund 
(team managed funds). I also exclude funds having fewer than two years of monthly 
returns. After this sample selection procedure, I am left with 891 fund manager 
replacements in the final sample, which consist of 188 unitary managed fund 
replacements and 703 replaced funds with the multiple fund manager structure23. 
The control sample is drawn from all funds from 1997 to 2001 that did not 
undergo a managerial change. To be included in the control sample, Morningstar or 
CRSP must report the fund’s turnover ratio, expense ratio, fund total net asset, capital 
gains overhang, fund age, 12b-1 fees, manager tenure, fund family affiliation and fund 
returns data. All funds that are team managed are excluded from the control sample. In 
this study, the control sample is utilized as reference funds to calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs), risk-adjusted returns (RARs), and objective-adjusted returns 
(OARs) and for the logistic regressions. The reference funds are matched by both the 
                                                                                                                                                 
a regression of the fund’s returns on the returns of its benchmarks.  Brown and Harlow (2006) find that the 
results are not sensitive to the approach taken. 
22 The Sirri and Tufano (1998) measure for asset flows was also utilized with similar results. This is defined 
as (TNA,t - TNAi,t-1) x (1+Ri,t-1)/TNAi,t-1 where TNAi,t is the total net asset for fund i at time t; and Ri,t-1 the 
raw return at time t-1. 
23 Both the Morningstar and the CRSP databases cover dead funds as well as active funds, therefore, 
survivorship bias is not a concern for this study. 
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stated CRSP objective and Morningstar investment style. Table 1 provides annual 
summary statistics for the control sample. The control sample consists of 8477 funds that 
did not have a managerial replacement during the sample period. Of the 8477 control 
sample funds, 1866 have unitary fund managers and the remaining 6611 control sample 
fund managers operate multiple funds simultaneously. Panel A through H of Table 2 
reports the results of the univariate fund-specific characteristics for the control sample.  
 
Description of full sample 
Table 1 summarizes the frequency with which fund managers are replaced in a 
year for the sample period 1997 to 2001. For each sample year, I report the total number 
of fund manager replacements as well as the cumulative number of replacement for the 
sample period. The largest number of manager replacements occurred in the final year of 
the sample period, 2001, with 198 replacements and 2000 had the least number of 
replacements, 140.  
Panel A: Replacement Sample
Cumulative  Cumulative  Unitary Fund Manager Multi-Fund Manager
Year Frequency Percent Frequency Percentage Replacement Replacement
1997 177 19.8653 177 19.865 30 147
1998 196 21.9978 373 41.863 42 154
1999 180 20.202 553 62.065 44 136
2000 140 15.7127 693 77.778 31 109
2001 198 22.2222 891 100 41 157
Total 891 100 188 703
Panel B: Control Sample
Total Replacement Unitary Replacement Multi-fund Replacement
Year Total Unitary Multifund Percentage Percentage Percentage
1997 1420 367 1053 12.465 8.174 13.960
1998 1719 390 1329 11.402 10.769 11.588
1999 1686 372 1314 10.676 11.828 10.350
2000 1792 374 1418 7.813 8.289 7.687
2001 1860 363 1497 10.645 11.295 10.488
Total 8477 1866 6611 53.001 50.355 54.072
Control Sample
This table summarizes the manager replacement and control samples, which were created by matching the Morningstar fund manager
database with the Center for Research and Securities Prices database. Manager replacement sample consist of distribution information of
891 mutual funds with start-up dates between January 1997 to December 2001. A management change is defined as any change in the fund's
portfolio manager. Managerial replacements are presented by replacement year. Each replacement is further divided into management
structure according to the number of funds simultaneously managed. The Unitary Fund Manager operates a single fund while the multi-fund
manager operates multiple funds simultaneously. The control sample consists of 8477 funds that do not undergo a managerial replacement
for the given period. Each control sample fund is further divided into management structure according to the number of funds
simultaneously managed.
Table 11: Managerial Replacement Distribution
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I decompose the sample of 891 fund manager replacements based on the number 
of funds managed simultaneously over the sample period. Fund managers that operate 
one fund are placed in the unitary fund management sample (UFM) and those managers 
that operate multiple funds simultaneously are placed in the multiple funds management 
sample (MFM). This sample decomposition yields 703 fund managers in the multiple 
funds management sample and 188 funds and fund managers in the unitary fund 
management sample. Table 2, Panel A through H, summarizes statistics for variables 
used in the analysis for each sample year as well as over the entire sample period. For 
each sample year, I report the total number of funds as well as the average size (measured 
by total net assets), net fund growth, manager tenure, fund age, expense ratio, turnover 
ratio, 12b-1 fees, and capital gains overhang. I compare each of the 891 replacement 
sample with an objective and style matched sample of mutual funds that did not have any 
managerial turnover (control sample). 
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N 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997-2001
Panel A
Total Replacement Sample 891 314.0250 399.5877 400.6508 524.5375 515.2213 430.8045
Fund Size UFM Replacement Sample 188 274.2100 391.8349 349.6533 469.3833 476.7853 392.3734
MFM Replacement Sample 703 324.6725 401.6610 414.2888 539.2872 525.5000 441.0819
Total Control Sample 8477 504.3041 558.4486 618.1343 641.5718 626.5382 589.7994
UFM Control Sample 1866 917.4616 1210.5838 1253.0419 1435.7492 1292.1143 1221.7902
MFM Control Sample 6611 387.6875 374.3789 438.9273 417.4097 438.6748 411.4157
Panel B
Total Replacement Sample 891 7.5561 10.1022 8.5701 12.0027 9.5394 9.5541
Capital Gains Overhang UFM Replacement Sample 188 13.2950 16.7000 9.0714 15.8920 14.2860 13.8489
MFM Replacement Sample 703 6.0214 8.3377 8.4360 10.9626 8.2700 8.4056
Total Control Sample 8477 7.5638 11.1654 9.1430 9.9205 10.7506 9.7086
UFM Control Sample 1866 12.5918 15.4370 12.9231 13.7781 15.3470 14.0154
MFM Control Sample 6611 6.1446 9.9597 8.0761 8.8317 9.4532 8.4930
This table summarizes various fund characteristics for the 5 sample years and for the whole sample period (1997 to 2001). For each sample year, I report the total number of
funds as well as the summary statistics for the managerial replacement and control samples. Statistics for the whole sample period are averages over all fund-years. UFM
represents funds that have managers that operate a sole unitary manager while MFM represents the funds that are managed by managers that operate multiple funds
simultaneously. Fund Size is the total fund net assets in billions. Capital Gains Overhang is the net unrealized appreciation (or depreciation) during the period reported by the
Morningstar database. Net Fund Growth is the change in the fund assets net of growth in existing assets. Manager tenure is the number of years a portfolio as overseen a
particular fund. Fund age is the number of years the fund as been in operation. Turnover Ratio is total purchases and sales divided by fund's average net asset value. Expense
Ratio is the mutual fund's total annual operating expenses (including operational fees, distribution fees, and other expenses) stated as a percentage of the fund's average net as
Management Fee is the fee the fund complex receives for managing shareholders assets, expressed in billions. Management fee is calculated as the total assets managed per
fund times the fund's expense ratio.The final column summarizes the mean differences between the management structures; unitary fund management and multiple fund
management. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics
-48.7085**
810.3745***
5.4433*
5.5224*
1997-2001
Year(s)
Management Structure
Difference (UFM-MFM)
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 Panel C
Total Replacement Sample 891 -13.7624 25.3542 29.6632 27.7719 -15.0218 10.8010
Net Fund Growth UFM Replacement Sample 188 -9.1436 44.7997 31.6094 44.8689 -11.6129 20.1043
MFM Replacement Sample 703 -14.9976 20.1540 29.1427 23.1998 -15.9334 8.3131
Total Control Sample 8477 -1.2969 34.4962 27.2929 31.7334 -12.4386 15.9574
UFM Control Sample 1866 -2.4873 43.7310 30.3565 42.3107 -8.4915 21.0839
MFM Control Sample 6611 -0.9609 31.8896 26.4282 28.7479 -13.5526 14.5104
Panel D
Total Replacement Sample 891 3.7100 5.7898 4.1510 5.3087 6.1141 5.0147
Manager Tenure UFM Replacement Sample 188 2.8889 4.6429 3.3636 4.1071 4.6218 3.9249
MFM Replacement Sample 703 3.9296 6.0966 4.3615 5.6300 6.5132 5.3062
Total Control Sample 8477 4.1991 4.1850 4.5569 4.9105 4.9192 4.5542
UFM Control Sample 1866 2.9531 3.6383 4.1748 5.3490 5.2861 4.2803
MFM Control Sample 6611 4.5508 4.3393 4.6648 4.7868 4.8156 4.6315
Panel E
Total Replacement Sample 891 8.9521 9.7909 10.1297 10.2882 9.1351 9.6592
Fund Age UFM Replacement Sample 188 7.8278 8.9748 9.5241 9.2194 8.7625 8.8617
MFM Replacement Sample 703 9.2528 10.0092 10.2917 10.5740 9.2347 9.8725
Total Control Sample 8477 9.7410 9.9989 9.8352 9.4586 9.6716 9.7411
UFM Control Sample 1866 9.5797 9.2113 9.6720 8.9328 9.0644 9.2921
MFM Control Sample 6611 9.7866 10.2212 9.8813 9.6070 9.8430 9.8678
-1.0108
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
11.7912*
6.5735*
-1.3813*
-0.3512
-0.5757
**
*
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Panel F
Total Replacement Sample 891 107.3043 87.0276 100.0136 92.1859 97.7494 96.8561
Turnover Ratio UFM Replacement Sample 188 110.2414 98.6842 112.2326 98.7778 103.5828 104.7037
MFM Replacement Sample 703 106.5188 83.9103 96.7459 90.4231 96.1893 94.7575
Total Control Sample 8477 90.8673 92.5717 91.5333 93.2344 97.5471 93.1508
UFM Control Sample 1866 97.1534 99.1394 92.7976 105.0851 108.6239 100.5599
MFM Control Sample 6611 89.0931 90.7179 91.1765 89.8895 94.4206 91.0595
Panel G
Total Replacement Sample 891 1.1328 1.1426 1.1414 1.1031 0.9727 1.0985
Expense Ratio UFM Replacement Sample 188 1.2047 1.2780 1.1716 1.1216 1.0750 1.1702
MFM Replacement Sample 703 1.1136 1.1064 1.1333 1.0981 0.9453 1.0794
Total Control Sample 8477 1.1326 1.1431 1.1717 1.1854 1.1858 1.1637
UFM Control Sample 1866 1.2760 1.2294 1.2849 1.3088 1.2723 1.2743
MFM Control Sample 6611 1.0921 1.1188 1.1397 1.1506 1.1613 1.1325
Panel H
Total Replacement Sample 891 0.1595 0.1772 0.1903 0.1313 0.1621 0.1641
12b-1 fees UFM Replacement Sample 188 0.0733 0.0884 0.0911 0.0617 0.0728 0.0775
MFM Replacement Sample 703 0.1826 0.2010 0.2168 0.1499 0.1860 0.1872
Total Control Sample 8477 0.1590 0.1743 0.1839 0.1445 0.1427 0.1609
UFM Control Sample 1866 0.0926 0.1073 0.1130 0.0702 0.0709 0.0908
MFM Control Sample 6611 0.1777 0.1932 0.2039 0.1654 0.1630 0.1806
Panel I
Total Replacement Sample 891 3.7171 4.2263 4.3318 4.5753 4.4187 4.2538
Management Fees UFM Replacement Sample 188 4.183712 5.022864 5.161229 5.387328 5.203662 4.9918
MFM Replacement Sample 703 3.592341 4.013284 4.110032 4.358112 4.208773 4.0565
Total Control Sample 8477 5.8438 6.3677 7.4643 7.8960 7.5796 7.0303
UFM Control Sample 1866 11.672486 13.971036 16.079218 18.423991 16.276864 15.2847
MFM Control Sample 6611 4.198568 4.221585 5.032697 4.924402 5.124743 4.7004
9.9462
9.5004
0.0908
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
10.584320***
0.1418
-0.1098
-0.0898
0.935251*
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 Several notable features emerge from the descriptive statistics in Table 2. For 
instance, the size of the average MFM replacement fund is consistently larger than that of 
the average UFM replacement fund and both sets are smaller than the average size of the 
control sample (Panel A, Table 2). This suggests that multiple fund managers are 
managing similar amounts of assets as the unitary fund manager just spread across more 
funds. The capital gains overhang is constantly larger for the unitary management sample 
than for the multiple management sample, indicating that, on average, UFM funds might 
have done better for existing investors in terms of capital gains. On the other hand, it 
suggests that multiple management structure may be preferred by (potential) new 
investors who desire to avoid the tax liability of previously built-up capital gains. Not 
surprisingly, the turnover ratio is larger for the unitary management structure who may 
sell more frequently to get rid of the capital gains overhang. As expected, the fund 
growth of the replacement sample, regardless of the management structure, is 
consistently lower than that of the industry average. This finding is consistent with the 
previous literature on the relationship between performance and manager replacement 
(see, e.g. Khorana (1996)). It is also interesting to note that of the replaced sample, MFM 
had lower fund growth in each year and over the full sample than UFM funds.  
It appears that the multiple fund management structure benefits from economies 
of scale resulting in a lower expense ratio (by about 10 basis points) than the unitary 
management structure. In addition, the 12b-1 fees are lower for the multiple management 
structure, suggesting a cost benefit to multiple fund management. One implication of this 
is that, if I find that fund sponsors are less likely to end the services of a manager that 
manages a single fund, possibly because it is more costly to the sponsor, then this is a 
clear indication of a conflict of interests because for the same level of underperformance 
investors would benefit more if the internal control mechanisms (pay for performance) 
worked effectively for the costlier funds/fund management system.  
The average managerial tenure for the unitary management replacements for the 
entire sample period is slightly shorter at 3.92 years than for the managerial tenure of the 
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multiple fund management structure, 5.31 years. This finding highlights the importance 
of managerial experience to operate multiple funds simultaneously. Furthermore, the 
average fund age across all funds for the sample with multiple fund management 
structure is 9.87 years, which is statistically significantly older than for the unitary 
management structure, 8.86 years. Thus, the MFM sample has more managerial 
experience than the UFM sample and operate older funds (Panel D and E).  
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics on both the multiple fund management 
and the multiple objective sub-samples. Panel A of Table 3 shows the mean (median) 
number of funds operated simultaneously by a manager that was replaced, where 
replacement means the manager was relieved of his responsibilities for at least one fund. 
The average number of funds operated simultaneously for the replacement sample (4.903 
funds) is slightly larger than the control sample (4.305 funds). However, the number of 
objectives managed simultaneously by the replacement sample (2.039 objectives) is 
smaller than the control sample (4.301 objectives), as reported in Panels C and D of 
Table 3. Taken together, these statistics indicate that not only are individual managers 
being asked to manage multiple funds simultaneously, but they are also being asked to 
manage funds with different objectives. Depending on how different these objectives are 
this practice could dampen their performance. 
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Panel A. Multiple Fund Management (MFM) replacement Sample
Year(s) N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
1997 147 4.267 4 1.457       2 6
1998 154 4.953 5 1.621       2 7
1999 136 5.149 5 1.868       2 7
2000 109 4.873 5 1.492       2 6
2001 157 5.259 5 2.016       2 6
All Years 703 4.903 5 1.601       2 7
Panel B. Multiple Fund Management (MFM) Control Sample
Year(s) N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
1997 1053 3.951 4 1.019 2 5
1998 1329 4.012 4 1.783 2 6
1999 1314 4.639 5 1.894 2 7
2000 1418 4.863 5 1.954 2 6
2001 1497 3.994 4 1.026 2 5
All Years 6611 4.305 5 1.821 2 7
Panel C. Multiple Objective Management (MOM) replacement Sample
Year(s) N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
1997 96 2.037 2 0.887 2 6
1998 89 2.012 2 0.8245 2 5
1999 91 2.024 2 0.677 2 4
2000 98 2.005 2 0.6619 2 3
2001 104 2.110 2 0.8753 2 6
All Years 478 2.039 2 0.7839 2 6
Panel D. Multiple Objective Management (MOM) Control Sample
Year(s) N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
1997 995 3.951 3 1.034 2 5
1998 1143 4.012 3 1.087 2 6
1999 1096 4.639 4 1.102 2 7
2000 1187 4.863 4 1.136 2 6
2001 1165 3.994 3 1.047 2 5
All Years 5586 4.301 3 1.100 2 7
Table 13: Multiple Funds and Multiple Objectives preliminary statistics
This table reports the mean and median number of funds and objectives of a sample of mutual
funds experiencing managerial turnover and the control sample between 1999 and 2001.
Multiple Fund Management structure (MFM) represents funds that have managers that operate
multiple funds simultaneously. Multiple Objectives Management structure (MOM) represents
funds that have managers that operate multiple objectives simultaneously. The standard
deviation as well as the minimum and maximum number of funds/ objectives operated are also
presented for each sample year.
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 I also decompose the replacement sample by objective and style. Table 4 displays 
the distribution of 891 fund manager replacements from 891 funds across fund objectives 
and styles over the sample period. The equity funds belong to one of nine Morningstar 
equity style categories, which group funds on the basis of the market capitalization and 
growth potential of their portfolios24. As expected, the majority of the replacements 
involves equity objectives/style funds. As noted in Brown and Goetzmann (1997), the 
dispersion in styles among the funds from the same objective category is quite high, 
which is consistent with the existing evidence (Grinblatt and Titman (1989,1993), 
Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997), 
and Wermers (2000)) on misclassification of funds in the objective categories. For 
instance, the aggressive growth, the long-term growth and international equity funds have 
at least one fund in each of the nine Morningstar equity-style categories. Similar levels of 
dispersion across styles are also observed in the 323 bond fund replacements sample. The 
high quality bond objective has the most dispersion with a fund in eight of the nine fixed-
income style categories. Only in the Single State Municipal Bond objective is there 70% 
of the funds concentrated in two style categories.  
                                                 
24 See the appendix in Goriaev (2003) “The relative impact of different classification schemes on mutual 
fund flows” for the definition of the Morningstar styles. 
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Panel A: Managerial Replacement Equity Funds
Objective/ Style Large Value Large Blend Large Growth Medium Value Medium Blend Medium Growth Small Value Small Blend Small Growth Total
Aggressive Growth (Ag) 14 3 7 3 7 13 10 7 19 83
Balance (BL) 8 8 4 2 4 6 0 11 0 43
Global Equity (GE) 2 6 6 0 2 5 2 4 0 27
Growth and Income (GI) 21 17 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 45
International Equity (IE) 17 14 16 14 7 9 6 5 7 95
Income (IN) 9 3 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 21
Long Term Growth (LG) 14 24 14 13 12 9 8 6 8 108
Precious Metals (PM) 0 0 0 0 5 0 4 3 6 18
Sector Fund (SF) 13 17 16 23 9 8 5 0 0 91
Total Return (TR) 4 4 3 5 7 0 3 0 0 26
Utility Fund (UT) 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 11
Total 110 96 73 70 55 50 38 36 40 568
Panel B: Managerial Replacement Bond Funds
Objective/ Style High-Short High-Intermediate High-Long Medium-Short Medium-Intermediate Medium-Long Low-Short Low-Intermediate Low-Long Total
High Quality Bond (BQ) 18 10 5 7 8 12 0 6 0 66
High Yield Bond (BY) 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 7 0 16
Global Bond (GB) 0 9 0 0 6 0 0 4 0 19
Ginnie Mae Bond (GM) 6 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
Government Security Bond (GS) 13 16 6 7 0 0 0 0 0 42
High Quality Municipal Bond (MQ) 9 10 17 2 4 3 0 0 0 45
Single State Municipal Bond (MS) 0 39 48 0 6 11 5 0 0 109
High Yield Municipal Bond (MY) 0 0 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 8
Total 46 91 81 16 30 32 10 17 0 323
This table reports the number of fund manager replacement observations with a given stated Center for Research and Securities Prices (CRSP) objective and Morningstar investment style over the
period January 1997 to December 2001. The Center for Research and Securities Prices database reports eleven equity and eight bond objective categories. The Morningstar database reports nine
equity style and nine fixed income style categories. Panel A reports the distribution for the managerial turnover equity fund sample while Panel B reports the distribution for the managerial turnover
bond fund sample. There are 891 managerial replacements including 568 equity fund replacements and 323 bond fund replacements.
Table 14: Managerial Replacement Sample Distribution
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 Methodology 
I measure abnormal returns for a replacement event-fund as the difference in 
returns between the replacement event-fund and the equal-weighted fund style category 
to which the fund belongs. For example, the style category-adjusted return for fund i 
during month t is: 
]1)1([]1)1([ ,, −+−−+= ∏∏ toti RRRAR       (8) 
where Ri,t is the return for fund i in month t, and Ro,t is the equal-weighted return of all 
funds in fund i’s category in month t. The average category-adjusted return during month 
t is calculated as 
∑= tit RARNRAR ,1          (9) 
where N equals the number of funds that experience a manager replacement event. 
Finally, the cumulative category-adjusted return over k event months is simply the sum of 
RAR t, 
∑=+ tktt RARCRAR ,                                         (10) 
As demonstrated in Table 4, funds within the same category have different 
investment objectives and exposed to different risk factors. Thus, I construct a 
performance measure that uses the equal-weighted average of all funds with the same 
investment objective as the benchmark, OAR. The use of the objective-adjusted 
performance measure is consistent with the argument put forth by Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1989) that firms make their managerial replacement decisions based on the 
industry benchmarks. The advantage of this benchmark is that it better controls for risk 
than the broader style category-based benchmark. However, both calculations measure 
fund performance relative to other managers in the peer group. 
Estimating the managerial-turnover relationship, I control for the determinants of 
replacement previously identified in the literature, such as past performance, size, age, 
fees, fund flows, and manager tenure (see, e.g., Khorana, 2001, Chevalier and Ellison, 
1997, Sirri and Tufano, 1998, and Nanda, Wang, and Zheng, 2000). As in Khorana 
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(1996), I use the objective and category-adjusted returns as separate performance 
measures in the following regression: 
 
itiOARplacementP εβα ++= −10)(Re               (11) 
itiRARplacementP εβα ++= −10)(Re  
where OAR and RAR are the objective- and category-adjusted fund returns, 
respectively.  
Interaction terms are also included to examine the relationship between abnormal 
returns and the probability of fund managers being replaced, when I account for 
management structure, manager tenure and total management fees. The interaction 
variables examine the relationship between replacement and management structure, 
manager tenure and management fees for a given level of underperformance. With these 
three interaction terms, I am able to further explore how well the internal governance 
mechanisms work for fund managers. As in Ai and Norton (2003), I include the 
following marginal interaction term effect estimation to understand the economic impact 
of the interaction terms. 
 
)*(*)](1)[(arg ePerformancmanceiUFMPerfordUFMxFxFinalEffectM +−= (12) 
 
where F(x) is the average implied probability of management replacement computed for 
each observation using the logit coefficients. Fund Performance is defined by the 
objective adjusted return (OAR) in year t and the risk adjusted return (RAR) in year t. 
Unitary Fund Manager is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a replaced 
manager operates a unitary fund and zero if that manager operates multiple funds 
simultaneously. 
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Empirical Results 
Performance-Replacement Relationship 
The relation between fund manager turnover and past performance has been 
established and well documented (see, e.g. Khorana, 1996, 2001, and Chevalier and 
Ellison, 1997). However, without considering the specific organizational form and, more 
specifically, the management structure of the fund family previous research might have 
significantly overstated the sensitivity of managerial replacement to past performance. In 
this section, I further analyze the relationship between managerial turnover and fund past 
performance with respect to both the objective and style category by including the 
management structure of the fund family.  
-2 to -1 -1 to 0 -½ to 0 0 to +½ 0 to +1 +1 to +2 -2 to -½ +½ to +2
Panel A: Risk Abnormal Return- Full Sample
N 870 870 870 870 870 870 870 870
CAR -0.0321 -0.0203 -0.0158 0.0275 0.0302 0.0265 -0.0176 0.0294
t-statistic -0.2024 -1.7834** -1.5395* 1.2930* 1.3950* 1.3476* -1.6295* 1.5018*
Panel B: Risk Abnormal Return- Equity Fund Sample
N 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
CAR 0.0860 -0.0116 -0.0244 0.0678 0.0737 0.0833 -0.0917 0.1556
t-statistic 0.3390 -1.6382* -2.2718** 2.2512** 1.6627** 2.3148** -1.6502** 2.3349***
Panel C: Risk Abnormal Return- Bond Fund Sample
N 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 318
CAR -0.0236 -0.0210 -0.0080 0.0163 0.0105 0.0339 -0.0316 0.0576
t-statistic -0.5513 -0.7722 -0.7918 0.6843 1.1924 0.9253 -0.9249 0.6981
Panel D: Objective Abnormal Return- Full Sample
N 870 870 870 870 870 870 870 870
CAR -0.0477 -0.0382 -0.0253 0.0235 0.0294 0.0294 -0.0246 0.0274
t-statistic -0.8353 -1.4833* -1.5550* 1.7206** 1.9400** 1.5921* -1.2870* 1.3295*
Panel E: Objective Abnormal Return- Equity Fund Sample
N 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
CAR -0.0273 -0.0364 -0.0401 0.0221 0.0271 0.0409 -0.0355 0.0282
t-statistic -1.0389 -1.6182* -1.7161** 1.3446* 1.8799** 1.5014* -1.4140* 1.5427*
Panel F: Objective Abnormal Return- Bond Fund Sample
N 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 318
CAR -0.0245 -0.0079 -0.0208 0.0138 0.0002 0.0014 -0.0017 0.0127
t-statistic -0.3315 -0.1858 -0.8467 2.3946* 1.3856* 1.4701* -1.1146 1.5664*
Years with respect to Managerial Turnover
This table presents the mean performance of actively managed funds that experienced managerial replacement in the period 1997 to 2001.The purpose of the risk-adjusted and
objective-adjusted matched sample approach is to compare funds that experienced replacement with those that did not for the given period. The table reports the abnormal return
values of the replaced manager sample in each year including a 6 month window around the replacement date. Year 0 refers to the year in which replacement occurred. The last
two columns of the table report the average differences between the pre- and post-replacement category -adjusted return across funds, using a -2 to -½ year and +½ to +2 year
event window, respectively. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 15: Performance in the years Pre- and Post- Manager Turnover: Full Sample
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I examine the pre- and post- replacement changes in objective- and style-adjusted 
performance. As in Khorana (2001), the impact of managerial turnover on fund 
performance is examined based on the changes in performance measures during four sub-
periods surrounding the event date: year -2 corresponds to the second year or 13 to 24 
months prior to replacement year, year -1 corresponds to the first year or 1 to 12 months 
prior to replacement year, so on and so forth. The overall results in Table 5, Panel A 
indicate a monotonic decrease, which is statistically significant different from zero, in 
fund performance for the replacement sample in the pre-replacement period, followed by 
a statistically significant increase in performance in the post-replacement period. Based 
on the style category performance estimates, managers exhibit significantly negative 
abnormal returns of 2.4 percent in the six months preceding managerial replacement. In 
Panel B, abnormal underperformance of funds with replaced managers is statistically 
significant for the equity fund replacement sample. This finding suggests that replaced 
managers perform significantly worse than those in the style category control group. 
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-2 to -1 -1 to 0 -½ to 0 0 to +½ 0 to +1 +1 to +2 -2 to -½ +½ to +2
Panel A: Risk Abnormal Return- Full Sample
N 716 716 716 716 716 716 716 716
CAR 0.0824 -0.0191 -0.0259 0.0365 0.0241 0.0062 -0.0124 0.0342
t-statistic 0.4940 -1.5652* -1.8131** 1.2829* 1.6004* 1.1262* -1.2981* 1.4319*
Panel B: Risk Abnormal Return- Equity Fund Sample
N 461 461 461 461 461 461 461 461
CAR 0.0989 -0.0167 -0.0456 0.0667 0.0789 0.0264 -0.0241 0.0624
t-statistic 0.4750 -1.3459* -2.4559*** 1.6893** 1.3348* 1.1973 -1.7642* 1.6523**
Panel C: Risk Abnormal Return- Bond Fund Sample
N 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255
CAR 0.0359 -0.0263 -0.0091 -0.0188 -0.0350 -0.0244 -0.0225 -0.0286
t-statistic 0.5660 -1.0515 -0.5512 -0.4141 -1.0774 -0.7080 -0.8778 -0.8744
Panel D: Objective Abnormal Return- Full Sample
N 716 716 716 716 716 716 716 716
CAR -0.0393 -0.0348 -0.0295 0.0257 0.0268 0.0130 -0.0296 0.0218
t-statistic -1.0573 -1.3821* -1.6251* 1.6450** 1.6426* 1.6376* -1.2899* 1.7860**
Panel E: Objective Abnormal Return- Equity Fund Sample
N 461 461 461 461 461 461 461 461
CAR -0.0455 -0.0413 -0.0464 0.0236 0.0364 0.0465 -0.0364 0.0354
t-statistic -0.7957 -1.6867** -1.4331* 1.2885* 1.9153** 1.8543** -1.7325** 1.7512**
Panel F: Objective Abnormal Return- Bond Fund Sample
N 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255
CAR -0.0323 -0.0103 -0.0263 0.0184 0.0104 0.0185 -0.0324 0.0154
t-statistic -0.3965 -0.4325 -0.9853 2.4432*** 1.4870* 1.5673* -1.2328 1.7643**
This table presents the mean performance of Multiple Fund Management (MFM) sample that experienced managerial replacement in the period 1997 to 2001.The purpose of the
risk-adjusted and objective-adjusted matched sample approach is to compare funds that experienced replacement with those that did not for the given period. The table reports the
abnormal return values of the replaced manager sample in each year including a 6 month window around the replacement date. Year 0 refers to the year in which replacement
occurred. The last two columns of the table report the average differences between the pre- and post-replacement category -adjusted return across funds, using a -2 to -½ year and
+½ to +2 year event window, respectively. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Years with respect to Managerial Turnover
Table 16: Performance in the years Pre- and Post- Manager Turnover: Multiple Fund Management (MFM) Sample
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-2 to -1 -1 to 0 -½ to 0 0 to +½ 0 to +1 +1 to +2 -2 to -½ +½ to +2
Panel A: Risk Abnormal Return- Full Sample
N 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154
CAR -0.0588 -0.0354 -0.0298 0.0449 0.0339 0.0299 -0.0188 0.0311
t-statistic -0.8643 -1.9474** -1.2846* 1.3172* 1.2873* 1.2997* -1.7346** 1.6239*
Panel B: Risk Abnormal Return- Equity Fund Sample
N 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
CAR 0.0954 -0.0167 -0.0444 0.0776 0.0786 0.1006 -0.0957 0.1613
t-statistic 0.2783 -1.7988** -2.0432** 2.3855*** 1.8935** 2.5255*** -1.3468* 2.4858***
Panel C: Risk Abnormal Return- Bond Fund Sample
N 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
CAR -0.0319 -0.0286 -0.0115 0.0194 0.0137 0.0359 -0.0427 0.0710
t-statistic -1.1345 -0.5325 -1.0045 1.1035 1.7286** 1.2149 -1.0245 1.2286
Panel D: Objective Abnormal Return- Full Sample
N 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154
CAR -0.0588 -0.0529 -0.0298 0.0294 0.0312 0.0443 -0.0288 0.0295
t-statistic -0.6136 -1.5466* -1.3658* 1.9013** 2.2654** 1.4735* -1.28651* 1.2853*
Panel E: Objective Abnormal Return- Equity Fund Sample
N 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
CAR -0.0358 -0.0429 -0.0578 0.0300 0.0309 0.0492 -0.0565 0.0323
t-statistic -1.3455* -1.5863* -2.0424** 1.5786* 1.6935** 1.4015* -1.3065* 1.5133*
Panel F: Objective Abnormal Return- Bond Fund Sample
N 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
CAR -0.0254 -0.0139 -0.0315 0.0237 0.0123 0.0235 -0.0139 0.0286
t-statistic -0.2755 -0.1468 -0.7433 2.1843** 1.3655* 1.43458* -1.0858 1.5063*
This table presents the mean performance of Unitary Fund Management (UFM) sample that experienced managerial replacement in the period 1997 to 2001.The purpose of the
risk-adjusted and objective-adjusted matched sample approach is to compare funds that experienced replacement with those that did not for the given period. The table reports the
abnormal return values of the replaced manager sample in each year including a 6 month window around the replacement date. Year 0 refers to the year in which replacement
occurred. The last two columns of the table report the average differences between the pre- and post-replacement category -adjusted return across funds, using a -2 to -½ year and
+½ to +2 year event window, respectively. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Years with respect to Managerial Turnover
Table 17: Performance in the years Pre- and Post- Manager Turnover: Unitary Fund Management Sample
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There are similar patterns when we disaggregate the sample of replaced managers. 
For the multiple fund management replacements sample Table 6, Panel A, reports that 
manager replacement is preceded by poor returns and that these returns improve during 
the period following the replacement. Specifically, during year -1, replacement event 
funds underperform their category averages by 1.9 percentage points. However, this 
underperformance turns into overperformance as early as six months following the 
managerial replacement. Table 6, Panel D, indicates that there is a 1.6 percentage points 
underperformance between the replacement event funds and the control funds for the 
Objective Abnormal Returns (OAR). As Table 7 indicates, I obtain similar results for the 
changes in the objective-adjusted return for the unitary management equity fund sample.  
Finally, there is a statistically and economically significant change in performance 
between the [-2,-½] and [+½,+2] event windows that is robust across both performance 
measures for both the unitary and multiple management structures. The average increase 
in abnormal performance is 3.4%, based on the MFM style category model, and 3.1%, 
based on the objective-adjusted return UFM sample. Thus, consistent with the findings in 
Khorana (2001), the event study statistics presented indicate a strong relationship 
between managerial turnover and past performance. In the next section, I implement a 
univariate regression model followed by a comprehensive multivariate model to further 
explore managerial turnover.  
It appears that MFMs have a shorter underperformance period before 
replacement. According to Khorana (1996), sponsors seem to “tolerate” 
underperformance of UFMs longer before acting. Panel A of Tables 6 and 7 indicate that 
MFMs have lower cumulative RARs in the -2,-½ window (-0.0124 vs. -0.0188) and 
experience negative returns for only one year before replacement, whereas UFMs 
experience losses for two years before replacement. This tolerance is not in the interest of 
investors, but may benefit sponsors as they can defer the higher costs involved in 
replacing a UFM manager. This is even of more importance to investors because it 
appears that UFM funds have a greater speed of recovery after a replacement, as 
evidenced by the larger average returns in the [0, +½] window – 4.49 percentage points 
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for UFMs vs. 3.65 for MFMs. Overall, the evidence is suggesting that since UFMs 
experience larger losses for longer periods before replacement but recover faster, if fund 
sponsors act in the interest of investors then we should observe that the probability of 
replacement is higher for UFMs for a given level of underperformance than for MFMs.  
However, this may not be the case because, as reported in Table 2, UFMs tend to have 
higher asset growth rates and higher fees than MFMs, suggesting that sponsors can 
benefit more from keeping them intact. 
 
Univariate Logistic Analysis 
I examine the managerial replacement decision using a univariate regression 
model on the multiple management structures as well as the determinants  of replacement 
previously identified in the literature: past performance (Khorana, 1996, 2001), fees, fund 
size and fund age (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997), and manager tenure (Nanda, Wang, and 
Zheng, 2000). I perform a logistic regression on a dichotomous variable equal to one if 
the fund undergoes managerial turnover and zero if the incumbent manager continues to 
operate the fund. The logistic regressions control for clustering along two dimensions 
(fund complex and year), as described in Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2006) and 
Petersen (2007). 
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constant Explanatory Variables Psuedo R² Observations
Risk-Adjusted Return
0.0309 -0.0288 0.0259 9172
(0.0096)   (<.0001)***
Objective-Adjusted Return
0.0204 -0.0521 0.0560 9172
(0.0007) (0.0022)***
Unitary Fund Manager
0.0482 -0.0125 0.0090 9368
(0.0062) (0.0070)***
Multiple Objectives Managed 
-0.2415 0.0658 0.0008 9368
(0.0496) (0.3799)
Logistic regression estimates of managerial replacement for 891 managers are
reported over the 1997 to 2001 period. Manager replacement is the dichotomous
dependent variable equal to one for the replacement sample and zero for the
control sample that have no managerial turnover. The observations are in fund-
years. Fund Performance is defined by the objective adjusted return (OAR) in year t 
and the risk adjusted return (RAR) in year t . Unitary Fund Manager is a
dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a replaced manager operates a
unitary fund and zero if that manager operates multiple funds simultaneously.
Multiple Objectives Managed is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one
if a replaced manager operates multiple objectives simultaneously and zero if that
manager operates fund(s) with one objective. Tracking error is constructed by
taking the standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of the fund’s return
on the returns of its benchmark. To calculate Style Drift, I regress each
fund’s returns over the year prior to replacement on the benchmark returns and
take 1-R2 as the measure of style drift. Capital Gains Overhang is the net
unrealized appreciation (or depreciation) during the period reported by the
Morningstar database. Manager tenure is the number of years a portfolio manager
has overseen a particular fund. Fund Size is the natural log of total fund net assets.
Fund age is the natural log of the fund’s age. Net Fund Growth is the change in the
fund assets net of growth in existing assets. Management Fee is the fee the fund
complex receives for managing shareholders assets, expressed in millions.
Management fee is calculated as the total assets managed per fund times the
fund's expense ratio. Turnover Ratio is total purchases and sales divided by fund's
average net asset value. Expense Ratio is the mutual fund's total annual operating
expenses (including operational fees, distribution fees, and other expenses) stated
as a percentage of the fund's average net assets. 12b-1 fee is charge by mutual
funds for advertising, promotion, distributions, marketing expenses, and often comm
in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
Table 18: Mutual Fund Manager Replacement Univariate Regressions
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(Continued)
constant Explanatory Variables Psuedo R² Observations
Management Fee 
-0.3951 0.0028 0.0003 9015
(<.0001) (0.3264)
Expense Ratio
1.0384 -0.6123 0.0052 9015
(0.0078) (0.0200)**
Fund Size 
0.0548 -0.0009 0.0002 9364
(0.0068) (0.3285)
Manager Tenure
1.8952 -1.1400 0.4522 9246
(<.0001) (<.0001)***
Style Drift
-0.9847 0.5863 0.0063 8985
(0.0015) (0.0079)***
Tracking Error
-0.7974 0.1026 0.0140 9172
(0.0006) (0.0052)***
Capital Gains Overhang
0.8737 -0.0132 0.0059 8892
(0.0063) (0.0089)***
Fund Age
-0.4642 0.1636 0.0074 9285
(0.0004) (0.0077)***
Net Fund Growth
-1.3295 0.0051 0.0004 9364
(<.0001) (0.1387)
Turnover Ratio
0.0431 -0.0018 0.0004 8942
(<.0001) (0.1934)
12b-1 Fee 
1.3843 -1.2433 0.0038 8939
(0.0320) (0.0493)**
Table 18: Mutual Fund Manager Replacement Univariate Regressions
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Consistent with previous literature, managerial replacement is inversely related to 
the past performance of a fund (Khorana 1996, 2001). Table 8 shows that both past 
performance regressions (RAR and OAR) indicate the presence of a significantly 
negative relation between the probability of managerial turnover and past performance 
(p-value = 0.0001 and 0.0022, respectively). The tracking error has a positive and 
statistically significant relation with the replacement of a fund manager. Brown, Harlow 
and Starks (1996) suggests that underperforming fund managers tend to have more erratic 
trading behavior seeking to improve their year-end performance. This positive relation 
between tracking error and managerial replacement can be explained by the fact that 
managers are compensated for their ability to outperform the benchmarks they track. 
Consistent with the findings in Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2000), probability of 
replacement has an inverse relation with manager tenure and explains a significantly 
large amount of the replacement decision, pseudo R2 = .45.  
As hypothesized earlier, the unitary fund management structure is negatively 
related to the probability of a manager being replaced. This finding suggests that unitary 
fund managers are less likely to be replaced than their multiple fund manager 
counterparts. Finally, the fees received by the management complex, expense ratio and 
12b-1 advertising fees, expressed as a percentage of total assets, have a negative and 
statistically significantly influence on the managerial turnover. This finding suggests that 
fund complexes are hesitant to replace managers than earn a significant amount of 
revenue for the company. The results in Table 8 indicate that there is no relation between 
the number of diverse objectives managed and manager replacement. Overall, these 
results provide the first indication that, like the literature suggests, there are a variety of 
criteria that have influence on the managerial replacement decision. Amongst these 
criteria is the management structure of the fund complex, measured by the number funds 
simultaneously operated.  
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Logistic Regressions 
 To examine if fund management structure affects the performance-
replacement relationship in a manner inconsistent with well-functioning internal control 
mechanism, I implement a multivariate regression in which I use the entire replacement 
sample to examine jointly the previously identified variables that influence managerial 
turnover. Specifically, I examine the relation between unitary fund management 
structures and the managerial replacement decision after controlling for fund 
characteristics such as size, age, expense ratio, turnover ratio, advertising fees and growth 
and other previously identified variables that affect the replacement decision. In Table 9, 
I report results of the logistic regressions. Similar to Khorana (1996), I find a 
significantly negative relation between the probability of manager replacement and the 
previous year fund performance [model (i), (iii), (iv) and (x)]. These results were 
obtained using the style category risk-adjusted return measure of managerial performance 
and are robust to using the objective-adjusted abnormal return (OAR) [model (v), (vii), 
(viii) and (ix)]. Consistent with the findings of Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2000), models 
(ii, iii, iv, viii) confirm the inverse relation between manager tenure and the probability of 
a manger replacement.  
 
Explanatory Variables model i model ii model iii model iv model v model vi model vii model viii model ix model x
Intercept 0.0501 2.3022 3.2199 0.2531 2.8777 3.0010 3.1068 3.4760 0.5827 0.6392
(0.6136) (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0840)* (0.0002)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0190)** (0.0003)***
Risk-Adjusted Return -0.0299 -0.0246 -0.0298 -0.0253
(<.0001)*** (0.0017)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Objective-Adjusted Return -0.0061 -0.0087 -0.0092 -0.0079
(0.0028)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0838)* (0.0273)**
Unitary Fund Manager -0.2360 -0.3564 -0.2794 -0.2253 -0.2539 -0.2308 -0.2675 -0.0736
(0.0327)** (0.0072)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0039)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0065)***
Multiple Objectives Manager -0.1163 -0.1421 -0.1389
(0.3252) (0.5662) (0.7138)
Management Fee 0.0027 0.0011 0.0002 0.0022 0.0026
(0.9593) (0.3318) (0.6375) (0.6047) (0.5823)
Expense Ratio -0.6024 -0.2549 -0.6540 -0.3493 -0.5220 -0.0185
(0.0211)** (0.4659) (0.0010)*** (0.3035) (0.0392)** (0.9117)
Fund Size -0.0004 -0.0069 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0063
(0.9217) (0.8769) (0.5537) (0.2951) (0.5571) (0.2689) (0.8916)
Manager Tenure -1.2130 -1.3443 -1.3847 -1.2437 -1.4032 -1.3813
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Style Drift 0.2489 0.6296 0.3241 0.3675
(0.5890) (0.1676) (0.2640) (0.2754)
Tracking Error 0.0158
(0.8118)
Manager tenure is the number of years a portfolio manager has overseen a particular fund. To calculate Style Drift, I regress each fund’s returns over the year
prior to replacement on the benchmark returns and take 1-R² as the measure of style drift. Tracking error is constructed by taking the standard deviation of the
residuals from a regression of the fund’s return on the returns of its’ benchmarks. Capital Gains Overhang is the net unrealized appreciation (or depreciation)
during the period reported by the Morningstar database. Fund age is the natural log of the fund’s age. Net Fund Growth is the change in the fund assets net of
growth in existing assets.Turnover Ratio is total purchases and sales divided by fund's average net asset value. 12b-1 fee is charge by mutual funds for
advertising, promotion, distributions, marketing expenses, and often commissions. Also included in Table 9 is an interaction term, abnormal return with UFM,
measuring the abnormal return of the unitary fund manager in the pre-replacement period. I include the marginal interaction term effect estimation to
understand the economic impact of the interaction terms. In Table 9, I also report the results of the joint significance of 
Logistic regression estimates of managerial replacement for 891 managers are reported over the 1997 to 2001 period. Manager replacement is the
dichotomous dependent variable equal to one for the replacement sample and zero for the control sample that have no managerial turnover. The observations
are in fund-years. Fund Performance is defined by the objective adjusted return (OAR) in year t and the risk adjusted return (RAR) in year t . Unitary Fund
Manager is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a replaced manager operates a unitary fund and zero if that manager operates multiple funds
simultaneously. Multiple Objectives Managed is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a replaced manager operates multiple objectives
simultaneously and zero if that manager operates fund(s) with one objective. Management Fee is the fee the fund complex receives for managing shareholders
assets, expressed in millions. Expense Ratio is the mutual fund's total annual operating expenses (including operational fees, distribution fees, and other
expenses) stated as a percentage of the fund's average net assets. Fund Size is the natural log of total fund net assets. 
the interaction variable and abnormal return. The p-values of the regression coefficients are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 19: Multivariate Regression results for all Mutual Fund Manager Replacements: Unitary Fund Management Specific
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Explanatory Variables model i model ii model iii model iv model v model vi model vii model viii model ix model x
Capital Gains Overhang -0.0016 -0.0109 -0.0124 -0.0017 -0.0072 -0.0107 -0.2489 -0.0071 -0.0027
(0.5739) (0.0078)*** (0.0120)** (0.5537) (0.2731) (0.0090)*** (0.4560) (0.2167) (0.4815)
Fund Age 0.3301 0.1065 0.0907
(0.0081)*** (0.1126) (0.5171)
Net Fund Growth 0.0015 0.0003 0.0029 0.0008 0.0017
(0.1496) (0.7548) (0.7119) (0.3601) (0.1399)
Turnover Ratio -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0027
(0.1858) (0.3281) (0.1402) (0.1932)
12b-1 Fee -0.4801 -0.1031 -1.2093 -1.2764 -0.3883 -1.1706 -0.9637 -0.2823
(0.1790) (0.8301) (0.0529)* (0.0968)* (0.4262) (0.1131) (0.1080) (0.4933)
Return*Unitary Fund Manager -0.0043 -0.0057 -0.0062 -0.0046 -0.0045 -0.0056 -0.0031
(0.0472)** (0.0358)** (0.0284)** (0.0501)* (0.0491)** (0.0357)** (0.0437)**
Marginal Interaction Term Effect -0.0191 -0.0346 -0.0190 -0.0277 -0.0245 -0.0316 -0.0066
Return and Interaction Variable -0.0163 -0.0158 -0.0156 -0.0025 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0025
Joint Significance (0.0002)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0018)*** (0.0027)***
Observations 9127 8634 8405 7927 8753 8171 8733 8392 8193 8204
Psuedo R² 0.2850 0.4847 0.5907 0.2980 0.5114 0.5087 0.5128 0.5816 0.3179 0.1363
Table 19: Multivariate Regression results for all Mutual Fund Manager Replacements: Unitary Fund Management Specific (Continued)
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In addition, I find that the fund management structure has a statistically 
significant relation with managerial turnover. The evidence indicates that fund managers 
in UFM fund have a lower probability of being replaced than managers of MFM funds. I 
also include an interaction term, abnormal return with UFM, measuring the abnormal 
return of the unitary fund manager in the pre-replacement period. This is an important 
test of the internal governance mechanism whereby fund sponsors evaluate managers 
based on performance and management structure. The interaction coefficient indicates 
that for a given level of performance, managers of funds with unitary management have a 
lower probability of being replaced than managers of MFM funds. The marginal 
interaction term effect reported in Table 9 indicates the probability of being replaced will 
be different for UFM and MFM at different levels of underperformance. Thus, the 
marginal interaction term effect of -0.0277 (model v) means that underperforming UFM 
are -2.77% less likely to be replaced than underperforming MFM counterparts. 
I also report the results of the joint significance of the interaction variable and 
abnormal return. The importance of the joint test is to see if the significant negative sign 
on return disappears or falls once we account for management structure. The statistically 
significant and negative coefficient of the joint significance variable confirms that even 
when unitary fund managers underperform the probability of getting replaced is lower 
than for multiple fund managers. Thus, the performance-replacement relationship is 
stronger for multiple fund managers than that of their unitary fund counterparts. This 
implies that fund complexes are more likely to replace underperformers when it is 
“cheap” because replacing a unitary fund manager is more expensive than taking one 
fund from a manager that manages multiple funds.  
The above results remain unchanged when past performance and manager tenure 
are considered jointly (model iii, vii and viii), or when fund characteristic control 
variables are included (model v and vi). The magnitude and the statistical significance of 
estimated unitary fund management coefficient are robust to changes in the model 
specification. The explanatory power of the unitary fund management plus other 
variables is significant across all models with relatively high R2s. These findings suggest 
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that there may be some economies of scale associated with the multiple fund 
management structure. However, once performance is compromised the fund complex 
replaces the manager. However, the multiple objective management variable has no 
explanatory power with respect to the managerial replacement decision.  
Explanatory Variables model i model ii model iii model iv model v model vi model vii model viii model ix model x
Intercept 0.4129 0.2835 0.8448 0.4665 0.9028 0.3397 0.7840 0.8971 1.0240 0.0287
(0.0002)*** (0.0070)*** (0.0039)*** (0.0104)*** (0.0577)* -0.1596 (0.0144)** (<.0001)*** (0.0014)*** (0.9207)
Risk-Adjusted Return -0.0342 -0.0318 -0.0357 -0.0295
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Objective-Adjusted Return -0.0072 -0.0101 -0.0089 -0.0114
(0.0792)* (0.0114)** (0.0232)** (0.0005)***
Unitary Fund Manager -0.0106 -0.0283 -0.0178 -0.0134 -0.0128 -0.0213
(0.04895)** (0.0851)* (0.0326)** (0.0465)** (0.0465)** (0.0228)**
Multiple Objectives Manager -0.0045
(0.9635)
Management Fee 0.0034 0.0041 0.0023
(0.5485) (0.4612) (0.9135)
Expense Ratio -0.3505 -0.2243 -0.1859 -0.1470 -0.1033
(0.0619)* (0.3674) (0.0206)** (0.4379) (0.5709)
Fund Size -0.0023 -0.0047 -0.0025 -0.0029 -0.0062 -0.0039 -0.0031
(0.7813) (0.9236) (0.6583) (0.5637) (0.9923) (0.4668) (0.5662)
Manager Tenure Dummy -1.9100 -1.8817 -2.2794 -2.1437 -2.365 -2.9509 -3.4167 -3.4065 -3.3916 -2.8326
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Style Drift 0.1344 0.0901 0.0869
value of one if a replaced manager has a tenure in the top half of the industry and zero if that manager has a tenure in the bottom half of the industry. To calculate
Style Drift, I regress each fund’s returns over the year prior to replacement on the benchmark returns and take 1-R² as the measure of style drift. Tracking error is
constructed by taking the standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of the fund’s return on the returns of its’ benchmarks. Capital Gains Overhang is the
net unrealized appreciation (or depreciation) during the period reported by the Morningstar database. Fund age is the natural log of the fund’s age. Net Fund Growth
is the change in the fund assets net of growth in existing assets.Turnover Ratio is total purchases and sales divided by fund's average net asset value. 12b-1 fee is
charge by mutual funds for advertising, promotion, distributions, marketing expenses, and often commissions. Also included in Table 10 is an interaction term,
abnormal return with high manager tenure, measuring the abnormal return of the managers with high tenure in the pre-replacement period. I include the marginal
interaction term effect estimation to understand the economic impact of the interaction terms. In Table 10, I also report 
Logistic regression estimates of managerial replacement for 891 managers are reported over the 1997 to 2001 period. Manager replacement is the dichotomous
dependent variable equal to one for the replacement sample and zero for the control sample that have no managerial turnover. The observations are in fund-years.
Fund Performance is defined by the objective adjusted return (OAR) in year t and the risk adjusted return (RAR) in year t . Unitary Fund Manager is a dichotomous
variable that takes the value of one if a replaced manager operates a unitary fund and zero if that manager operates multiple funds simultaneously. Multiple
Objectives Managed is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a replaced manager operates multiple objectives simultaneously and zero if that
manager operates fund(s) with one objective. Management Fee is the fee the fund complex receives for managing shareholders assets, expressed in millions.
Expense Ratio is the mutual fund's total annual operating expenses (including operational fees, distribution fees, and other expenses) stated as a percentage of the
fund's average net assets. Fund Size is the natural log of total fund net assets. High Manager Tenure is a dichotomous variable that takes the 
the results of the joint significance of the interaction variable and abnormal return. The p-values of the regression coefficients are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 20: Multivariate Regression results for all Mutual Fund Manager Replacements: High Management Tenure Specific
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(0.6823) (0.7780) (0.7800)
Explanatory Variables model i model ii model iii model iv model v model vi model vii model viii model ix model x
Tracking Error 0.0261 0.0681
(0.5568) (0.1006)
Capital Gains Overhang -0.0053 -0.0050 -0.0058 -0.0049 -0.0046 -0.0051 -0.0035 -0.0037
(0.9858) (0.0682)* (0.0973)* (0.1563) (0.3397) (0.0753)* (0.4213) (0.3864)
Fund Age 0.1939 0.2047 0.0311 0.1846 0.1249
(0.0232)** (0.0145)** (0.7384) (0.0113)** (0.1440)
Net Fund Growth -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0013
(0.0856)* (0.0746)* (0.4022) (0.0934)* (0.1467) (0.1087)
Turnover Ratio -0.0017 -0.0039 -0.0012 -0.0066 -0.0009
(0.8321) (0.7209) (0.0785)* (0.3880) (0.3395)
12b-1 Fee -0.5217 -0.2568 -0.0104 -0.5899 -0.1340 -0.3049
(0.1654) (0.5769) (0.9849) (0.1262) (0.7679) (0.4802)
Return*High Manager Tenure -0.0148 -0.0198 -0.0088 -0.0043 -0.0092 -0.0085 -0.0082 -0.0288
(0.0591)* (0.0552)* (0.0782)* (0.0980)* (0.6096) (0.0644)* (0.0656)* (0.0419)**
Marginal Interaction Term Effect -0.0799 -0.1423 -0.1773 -0.1482 -0.2807 -0.2818 -0.2769 -0.1979
Return and Interaction Variable -0.0324 -0.0308 -0.0333 -0.0067 -0.0090 -0.0079 -0.0105 -0.0294
Joint Significance (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0846)* (0.0187)** (0.0353)** (0.0007)*** (<.0001)***
Observations 7933 7933 8217 8193 8598 7969 8197 8213 8186 8456
Psuedo R² 0.1677 0.1391 0.2165 0.2097 0.2177 0.2196 0.2535 0.2548 0.2505 0.2376
Table 20: Multivariate Regression results for all Mutual Fund Manager Replacements: High Management Tenure Specific (Continued)
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I interpret the findings that managers of UFM have a lower probability of being 
replaced, for any given level of performance, than managers of MFM funds as evidence 
of a conflict of interests between investors and fund sponsors. This, as discussed before, 
is because fund sponsors’ reluctance to terminate single-fund managers is driven by cost-
savings consideration of the sponsor. The preliminary evidence (Table 2) indicates that 
UFM funds have higher asset growth rates, which is beneficial to the sponsors. In 
contrast, these funds have higher expense ratios, which makes their governance even 
more important to investors because higher expenses reduces investors’ terminal wealth 
while benefiting fund sponsors whose management fees are included in the fund’s 
expense ratio. Therefore, taken together, the evidence does not support the claim of well-
functioning internal mechanisms for mutual fund managers at least not without 
qualifications. 
To further explore the internal governance mechanisms for fund managers, I 
examine the joint significance of manager tenure and management fees with abnormal 
returns. In Table 10, I conduct a logistic regression model in which the probability of 
managerial turnover is explained by a dichotomous manager tenure variable. Manager 
tenure takes the value of one if the replaced managers’ tenure is greater than the median 
(Table 2, Panel D), and zero otherwise. Consistent with the findings in Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999a,b) and Gallagher (2003), the manager tenure dummy variable is inversely 
related to the probability of managerial replacement. The interaction term, abnormal 
return and manager tenure, measures the influence of abnormal returns for managers with 
longer tenures on the probability of replacement. The evidence indicates that for any 
given level of performance the probability of getting replaced is lower than that of less 
experienced managers. Thus, according to the marginal effect term, an experienced fund 
manager will be 14.8% less likely to be replaced than an inexperienced manager, even 
though both of them are underperforming. The evidence for tenure does not really make a 
strong case because if a tenured manager with a history of good performance hits a rough 
spot there is good reason to hope he is going to become a high performance later, so 
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sponsors may tolerate low performance. These findings suggest weak and limited internal 
governance mechanisms for fund management.  
Finally, I examine the internal governance of mutual funds with the joint 
significance of abnormal return and the high total fees binary variable. Table 11 
documents these results. For all models, the joint significance of abnormal 
return*management fee variable is statistically insignificant. This finding suggests some 
level of governance concerning the revenue to the fund complex.  
Explanatory Variables model i model ii model iii model iv model v model vi model vii model viii model ix model x
Intercept 0.1461 1.2876 2.5961 0.3064 0.2919 2.8074 1.9998 0.2890 0.2992 0.3205
(0.3480) (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0942)* (0.1092) (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0.2508) (0.3195) (0.3854)
Risk-Adjusted Return -0.0299 -0.0351 -0.0305 -0.0295
(<.0001)*** (0.0018)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0003)***
Objective-Adjusted Return -0.0086 -0.0132 -0.0084 -0.0096
(0.0139)** (0.0175)** (0.0258)** (0.0284)**
Unitary Fund Manager -0.0866 -0.0813 -0.3701 -0.1357 -0.0913
(0.0580)* (0.0618)* (0.0179)** (0.0419)** (0.0639)*
Multiple Objectives Manager -0.3548 -0.2570
(0.2643) (0.1002)
Total Expenses & Fees Dummy -0.1596 -0.1571 -0.1437 -0.0617 -0.0201 -0.0807 -0.0197 -0.1197 -0.2776 -0.1845
(0.2422) (0.3794) (0.5716) (0.6943) (0.8892) (0.8547) (0.9432) (0.0480)** (0.2439) (0.3154)
Fund Size -0.0002 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0050 -0.0078 -0.0021
(0.1672) (0.4999) (0.5100) (0.6787) (0.8665) (0.6768)
Manager Tenure -1.1857 -1.2905 -1.3539 -1.3438
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Style Drift 0.7518 0.3338 0.7149
(0.0899)* (0.2394) (0.0914)*
Tracking Error 0.0094 0.0156 0.0095
replaced manager has total expenses in the top half of the industry and zero if that manager has total expenses in the bottom half of the industry. Fund Size is the
natural log of total fund net assets. Manager tenure is the number of years a portfolio manager has overseen a particular fund. To calculate Style Drift, I regress each
fund’s returns over the year prior to replacement on the benchmark returns and take 1-R² as the measure of style drift. Tracking error is constructed by taking the
standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of the fund’s return on the returns of its’ benchmarks. Capital Gains Overhang is the net unrealized appreciation
(or depreciation) during the period reported by the Morningstar database. Fund age is the natural log of the fund’s age. Net Fund Growth is the change in the fund
assets net of growth in existing assets.Turnover Ratio is total purchases and sales divided by fund's average net asset value. 12b-1 fee is charge by mutual funds for
advertising, promotion, distributions, marketing expenses, and often commissions.Also included in Table11 is an interaction term, abnormal return with total expenses
(expense ratio, management and 12b-1 fees), measuring the abnormal return of the managers with 
Logistic regression estimates of managerial replacement for 891 managers are reported over the 1997 to 2001 period. Manager replacement is the dichotomous
dependent variable equal to one for the replacement sample and zero for the control sample that have no managerial turnover. The observations are in fund-years.
Fund Performance is defined by the objective adjusted return (OAR) in year t and the risk adjusted return (RAR) in year t . Unitary Fund Manager is a dichotomous
variable that takes the value of one if a replaced manager operates a unitary fund and zero if that manager operates multiple funds simultaneously. Multiple Objectives
Managed is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a replaced manager operates multiple objectives simultaneously and zero if that manager operates
fund(s) with one objective. Management Fee is the fee the fund complex receives for managing shareholders assets, expressed in millions. Expense Ratio is the mutual
fund's total annual operating expenses (including operational fees, distribution fees, and other expenses) stated as a percentage of the fund's average net assets. Total
Expenses is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a 
high management fees in the pre-replacement period. I include the marginal interaction term effect estimation to understand the economic impact of the interaction
terms. In Table 11, I also report the results of the joint significance of the interaction variable and abnormal return. The p-values of the regression coefficients are in
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 21: Multivariate Regression results for all Mutual Fund Manager Replacements: Total Expenses Specific
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(0.9886) (0.7109) (0.3240)
Ex
Cap
Fund Age 
Net
Tu
Ret
M
Ret
Jo
O
Ps
planatory Variables model i model ii model iii model iv model v model vi model vii model viii model ix model x
ital Gains Overhang -0.0014 -0.0121 -0.0123 -0.0062 -0.0057 -0.0032
(0.6149) (0.0040)*** (0.0151)** (0.3365) (0.3298) (0.3947)
0.1056 0.3147 0.0696 0.0596 0.0756 0.2626 0.0618
(0.1139) (0.0118)** (0.3675) (0.4374) (0.5855) (0.03664)** (0.4376)
 Fund Growth -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0026 -0.0120 -0.0019 -0.0056
(0.0953)* (0.0629)* (0.0861)* (0.7776) (0.2378) (0.0325)** (0.4266)
rnover Ratio -0.0021 -0.0015 -0.0996
(0.0435)** (0.2957) (0.3275)
urn*Total Expnses & Fees -0.0029 -0.0195 -0.0030 -0.0155 -0.0099 -0.0024 -0.0059 -0.0061
(0.8405) (0.4412) (0.8555) (0.2271) (0.3548) (0.7460) (0.7401) (0.6931)
arginal Interaction Term Effect -0.0045 -0.0162 -0.0051 -0.0081 -0.0024 -0.0028 -0.0082 -0.0066
urn and Interaction Variable -0.0207 -0.0223 -0.0236 -0.0034 -0.0071 -0.0052 -0.0059 -0.0064
int Significance (<.0001)*** (0.0071)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0472)** (0.0885)* (0.0570)* (0.0741)* (0.0733)*
bservations 7927 8138 8404 8169 8169 8753 8392 8193 8590 8183
uedo R² 0.0286 0.4961 0.5792 0.0319 0.0297 0.5092 0.5828 0.0206 0.0417 0.0638
Table 21: Multivariate Regression results for all Mutual Fund Manager Replacements: Total Expenses Specific (Continued)
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Managerial Turnover from Demotion 
One of the major issues within the mutual fund managerial turnover literature is 
the difficulty in distinguishing manager replacement due to promotion and manager 
replacement due to demotion. Hu, Hall and Harvey (2000) identify management 
promotions and demotions by cross referencing the Morningstar database with the reports 
from Lexis Nexis Inc. and define demotion as a manager moving to a smaller size fund or 
forced out of the mutual fund industry. Since this study focuses on the governance 
mechanisms within the mutual fund industry, I am only concerned with managerial 
replacements due to demotions. Khorana (1996) reports an inverse relation between the 
probability of fund manager replacement and past performance.  Thus, this study defines 
replacement due to demotion as poor performance; the one year negative abnormal return 
of a mutual fund manager.  
In Table 12 I conduct robustness test using only those manager replacements that 
had negative one-year pre-replacement returns. The results in Table 12 also indicate a 
negative relationship between the probability of managerial changes and fund structure. 
A comparison of Tables 9, 10 and 11 with Table 12 suggests that fund structure exhibits a 
stronger inverse relationship with manager demotion than with manager replacement. 
This evidence suggests that a unitary fund manager is less likely to be fired or demoted 
than their multiple fund manager peers. As stated earlier, since it is more costly for a fund 
sponsor to replace a unitary fund manager than take a fund from a multiple fund manager, 
the fund sponsor is more hesitant to replace a unitary fund manager regardless of the 
fund’s performance. This presents a conflict of interests between the investors request for 
superior returns and the sponsors’ desire to lower costs for the sponsor.  
As hypothesized above, the coefficients of the abnormal return variables and net 
fund growth variables are negative in Table 12. There is a stronger association between 
the performance variables and manager replacement. For the demotion sample (Table 12) 
these coefficients are ranging from -0.0109 and -0.0718, whereas for the replacement 
sample (Table 9) they range from -0.006 and -0.0299. In contrast to the replacement 
sample, the expense ratio has consistent and statistically significant explanatory power 
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for the probability of demotion. However, the management fee and total expenses and 
fees variables are insignificant in all models. The coefficients on the manager tenure 
variables are negative and statistically significant in all seven models. Compared to the 
models that include the entire replacement sample, the demotion replacement sample 
exhibits lower correlation between the probability of replacement and manager tenure. 
The evidence suggests that there are conflict of interests between fund sponsors and 
investors due to the management structure and that there are governance mechanisms in 
place to address these conflicts. However, these governance mechanisms don’t 
completely protect investors from fund sponsor interests. 
Table 22: Multivariate Regression results for Poor Performing Funds
Logistic regression estimates of managerial replacement for 539 managers that had one year of poor performance (negative cumulative abnormal returns)
prior to replacement. Manager replacement is the dichotomous dependent variable equal to one for the replacement sample and zero for the control sample
that have no managerial turnover. The observations are in fund-years. Fund Performance is defined by the objective adjusted return (OAR) in year t and the
risk adjusted return (RAR) in year t . Unitary Fund Manager is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a replaced manager operates a unitary
fund and zero if that manager operates multiple funds simultaneously. Multiple Objectives Managed is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a
replaced manager operates multiple objectives simultaneously and zero if that manager operates fund(s) with one objective. Management Fee is the fee the
fund complex receives for managing shareholders assets, expressed in millions. Expense Ratio is the mutual fund's total annual operating expenses
(including operational fees, distribution fees, and other expenses) stated as a percentage of the fund's average net assets.  
Total Expenses is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a replaced manager has total expenses in the top half of the industry and zero if that
manager has total expenses in the bottom half of the industry. Fund Size is the natural log of total fund net assets. Manager tenure is the number of years a
portfolio manager has overseen a particular fund. High Manager Tenure is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a replaced manager has a
tenure in the top half of the industry and zero if that manager has a tenure in the bottom half of the industry. To calculate Style Drift, I regress each fund’s
returns over the year prior to replacement on the benchmark returns and take 1-R² as the measure of style drift. Tracking error is constructed by taking the
standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of the fund’s return on the returns of its’ benchmarks. Capital Gains Overhang is the net unrealized
appreciation (or depreciation) during the period reported by the Morningstar database. Fund age is the natural log of the fund’s age. Net Fund Growth is the
change in the fund assets net of growth in existing assets.Turnover Ratio is total purchases and sales divided by 
fund's average net asset value. 12b-1 fee is charge by mutual funds for advertising, promotion, distributions, marketing expenses, and often commissions.
Also included in Table 12 is an interaction term, abnormal return with UFM, measuring the abnormal return of the unitary fund manager in the pre-
replacement period; abnormal return with high manager tenure, measuring the abnormal return of the managers with high tenure in the pre-replacement
period; and abnormal return with total expenses (expense ratio, management and 12b-1 fees), measuring the abnormal return of the managers with high
management fees in the pre-replacement period. I include the marginal interaction term effect estimation to understand the economic impact of the interaction
terms. In Table 12, I also report the results of the joint significance of the interaction variable and abnormal return. The p-values of the regression coefficients
are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Explanatory Variables model i model ii model iii model iv model v model vi model vii model viii model ix model x
Intercept 2.1050 1.4290 3.4326 2.0594 3.0113 1.0328 2.9204 1.9584 2.1329 1.6227
(<.0001)*** (0.0025)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0030)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0031)***
Risk-Adjusted Return -0.0718 -0.0683 -0.0699 -0.0703 -0.0645
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Objective-Adjusted Return -0.0109 -0.0116 -0.0224 -0.0193
(0.0004)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0201)** (0.0066)***
Unitary Fund Manager -0.8205 -0.9138 -0.8864 -0.8307 -0.8376 -0.8154 -0.7853 -0.8091
(0.0004)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0003)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0007)***
Multiple Objectives Manager -0.4305 -0.3875 -0.2950
(0.2065) (0.3384) (0.2986)
Management Fee -0.0338 -0.0912 -0.0117
(0.9023) (0.9108) (0.9157)
Expense Ratio -0.5230 -0.3995 -0.6041 -0.4203
(0.00518)* (0.0428)** (0.0032)** (0.0495)**
Total Expenses & Fees -0.5212 -0.5526 -0.4837
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(0.4274) (0.4061) (0.3985)
Explanatory Variables model i model ii model iii model iv model v model vi model vii model viii model ix model x
Fund Size -0.0022 -0.0054 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0091 -0.0077
(0.8913) (0.7697) (0.6538) (0.5993) (0.8416) (0.8621) (0.7812)
Manager Tenure -1.1380 -1.0570 -1.1011 -1.0534
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
High Manager Tenure -1.3460 -1.6775 -1.7317
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Style Drift 0.4733 0.6694 0.5432
(0.3792) (0.2129) (0.2583)
Tracking Error 0.0378 0.0478 0.0575
(0.6398) (0.7985) (0.7154)
Capital Gains Overhang -0.0058 -0.0260 -0.0732 -0.0813 -0.0268 -0.3352
(0.4831) (0.3903)** (0.2512) (0.2743) (0.4137) (0.3585)
Fund Age 0.2146 0.1832 0.2195
(0.1073) (0.1166) (0.1319)
Net Fund Growth -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0073
(0.0816)* (0.0916)* (0.0744)* (0.0671)* (0.0921)*
Turnover Ratio -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0007
(0.2186) (0.3384) (0.4147) (0.3285)
12b-1 Fee -0.2667 -0.6146 -0.7828 -0.4257
(0.1121) (0.10507) (0.1205) (0.1006)
Return*Unitary Fund Manager -0.0912 -0.0849 -0.0217
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (0.0004)***
Return*High Manager Tenure -0.9710 -0.7724 -0.8968
(<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Return*Total Expnses & Fees -0.0366 -0.0245 -0.0345
(0.0035)*** (0.0221)** (0.0013)***
Marginal Interaction Term Effect -0.0760 -0.0866 -0.1160 -0.1631 -0.1542 -0.0502 -0.0481 -0.0460 -0.0717
Return and Interaction Variable -0.0072 -0.0057 -0.0663 -0.0084 -0.0097 -0.0034 -0.0011 -0.0024 -0.0008
Joint Significance (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)*** (<.0001)***
Observations 8796 8303 8074 7596 8422 7840 8402 8061 7862 7873
Psuedo R² 0.4007 0.1427 0.4645 0.3276 0.4536 0.3133 0.4206 0.3048 0.4135 0.3106
Table 22: Multivariate Regression results for Poor Performing Funds (Continued)
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Conclusion 
The inverse relationships between manager turnover on the one hand and past 
performance and manager tenure, respectively, on the other hand have been well 
documented. However, this paper is the first to document that management structure and 
other fund characteristics affect the probability of managerial turnover in a manner 
consistent with the existence of a conflict of interests between investors and sponsors. 
Using a sample of 891 equity and bond fund managerial replacements over the 1997 to 
2001 period, I document that unitary fund managers have an approximately 2% lower 
probability of experiencing replacement than their multiple fund management peers. As 
hypothesized, fund complexes tend to replace underperformers only when it is “cheap” 
because replacing a unitary fund manager is more costly to the fund sponsor than taking 
one fund from a manager that operates multiple funds. Conversely, the number of funds a 
manager operates simultaneously has a positive relation with the probability of that 
manager being replaced. Coupled with the past performance, these results are consistent 
with the argument that there are some economies of scale benefits to multiple fund 
management. However, once the fund performance deteriorates the manager is released 
from his duties for that fund faster than the manager who manages a single fund. 
Despite the large body of research on managerial turnover, previous studies have 
only examined (or assumed there exists only) the unitary management structure.  The 
failure to account for the multiple fund management structure ignores an additional 
impact fund managers have on the fund complex. For instance, fund complexes increase 
total profits by increasing (or at least maintaining) the level of inflows and decreasing the 
individual cost of operating each fund. Khorana (2001) suggests that in a competitive 
market, management expense ratios should decline over time where investors become 
more price-sensitive, investment management firms increase in size and improve their 
economies of scale. As noted earlier, fund complexes that deploy the multiple 
management structure have lower expense ratios on average. 
Using a series of carefully constructed multivariate logistics regressions, I 
examine the internal governance mechanisms within the mutual fund industry utilizing 
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interaction terms and joint significance analysis. This study utilizes a marginal interaction 
term effect methodology presented in Ai and Norton (2003) to document to marginal 
change in management structures for a given level of underperformance. I also employ 
cluster analysis to account for two dimensions (fund complex and year) of variation. I 
document weak and limited internal governance mechanisms within the mutual fund 
industry because for a given amount of underperformance fund sponsors are significantly 
likely to replace fund managers who manage a single fund than those who manage 
multiple funds. These findings suggest that if managers operate a single fund or have a 
great deal of experience they are even less likely to be replaced than previous literature 
states.  
In summary, this area of research is significant given the responsibility of fund 
sponsors in managing their investment managers, the sizable assets under their control, 
the significant research effort and resources dedicated to the research of investments 
management institutions. Thus, the use of the fund management structure that benefits 
both the fund complex as well as the investor provides additional insights into this 
dynamic and multifaceted industry. 
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